The Battle of the Frontiers: Ardennes 1914 (review)

Terence Zuber’s book is a detailed account of the Battle of the Frontiers, which took place from 20 to 24 August 1914. In the last sentence of the book, he states, “This study has been an attempt to put the history of the Battle of the Frontiers in the Ardennes back on a firm professional military and historical basis” (p. 284). The “firm” basis is clearly tactics and doctrine, for Zuber argues that tactics, not strategy, is the “foundation of warfare” (p. 7). He also emphasizes that the battle was a “perfect test” (p. 8) for the Germans and French. Again and again, he notes the superiority of the Germans and argues the battle was “nothing less than a complete vindication of German tactical doctrine and training” (p. 127). In his conclusion, he adds, “The German army had reached a military pinnacle--it knew how to fight outnumbered and win” (p. 283).

In the broadest sense the book contributes to our understanding of the battle, for Zuber relies on numerous German regimental histories and French sources that have not been used or have been used infrequently in English-language works in the past. He also provides detailed information that will be greatly appreciated by those studying different aspects of the battle. The book nonetheless suffers from several serious flaws that detract substantially from its overall quality.

First, one must question whether the German military system deserves the praise Zuber gives it. While one cannot dismiss the importance of tactics in the Battle of the Frontiers, one also cannot think of the initial part of the 1914 campaign without remembering that the Germans failed to defeat the French--either in the Marne campaign or in the war. The Germans may have had the best doctrine and tactics during the Battle of the Frontiers, but they obviously had some deficiencies that limited their success later in the war. An awareness of these deficiencies should have informed Zuber’s assessment of the Germans in the Battle of the Frontiers and perhaps tempered his extremely positive view of them.

Second, Zuber unfairly dismisses previous French studies of the 1914 battles as “fantasies.” In essence he uses several French sources as straw men, calling them “apologists,” and then easily dismantles them, thereby supposedly setting our understanding of the battle on a firmer historical basis. This is especially the case for books written by Alphonse Grasset. At one point Zuber criticizes Grasset for misunderstanding security in an operation and then jumps to an unwarranted conclusion: “This proves only that even in 1930, 16 years after the event, the French army did not understand the tactical problem in 1914” (p. 164). He insists the French learned no lessons from the battle and jumps to another simplistic, unwarranted conclusion when he says that this explains “the miserable performance of the French army in similar battles in 1939 and 1940” (p. 308). In fact, Zuber’s notes reflect only a limited investigation of French efforts to understand the battle, and he demonstrates little understanding of how the French actually tried to learn from their experiences.

Third, the book reads more like a catalogue than a sophisticated military history. At times the narrative of the book appears to consist of loosely related paragraphs marked with subtitles and then strung together by cutting and pasting with a word processor. This makes the book extremely difficult to read and useful primarily for those looking up information about the battle. Yet, the utility of the book for even this special use is limited by the absence of an index.

In the final analysis, the book is a great disappointment. Zuber had the opportunity to fill a much-neglected area in our understanding of the First World War, but he failed to rise to the challenge. His impressive work with German sources is not matched by his work with French sources, and his understanding of the...