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  • Forging the Shield: Eisenhower and National Security for the 21st Century
  • Wyndham Whynot
Forging the Shield: Eisenhower and National Security for the 21st Century. Edited by Dennis E. Showalter. Chicago: Imprint Publications, 2005. ISBN 1-879176-44-0. Appendixes. Notes. Index. Pp. 235. $24.95.

During President Dwight Eisenhower's administration and for some years afterward, the media portrayed Eisenhower as a caretaker or "an amiable dolt" (p. 1). Yet, viewed through the lenses of history, we see these judgments were incorrect. Eisenhower chose substance over style when it came to matters of national security. This book provides a broad and at times in-depth look at Eisenhower's impact on various aspects of the United States' national security establishments during the Cold War era and his desire to avoid unnecessarily massive spending increases on national security.

The book is a collection of essays presented during a 2005 symposium on "Eisenhower and National Security for the 21st Century" at the National Defense University and edited by Dennis E. Showalter. The essays focus primarily on Eisenhower's dictum "Let's not make our mistakes in a hurry" (p. 3) in regards to national security. The writers have done a great job of showing Eisenhower's deliberateness in making policy decisions. Some essays focus on the international scene with articles on China, Korea, and the Soviet Union by Qiang Zhai, Allan R. Millett, and Sergei N. Khrushchev respectively. Others cover specific agencies such as the CIA, NSA, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and NASA by Clayton D. Laurie, David A. Hatch, R. Cargill Hall, and Roger D. Launius respectively. The remaining essays focus on Eisenhower's defense-related policies concerning the military and the industrial-military complex.

Each article stresses Eisenhower's understanding of the impact of nuclear weaponry and its influence on national security, especially with respect to the need for solid intelligence to develop programs or policies based on probable enemy intentions. Eisenhower used the information gained from programs he authorized or initiated to avoid getting into a spending war over the so-called "bomber" and "missile gaps," despite the impact it might have had on Vice-President Richard Nixon's presidential campaign in 1960. Clayton Laurie's article on the CIA presents an interesting view of Eisenhower's use of the agency to play an important, but overlooked, role in the "New Look" strategy. All of the essays are well researched with ample documentation to point readers to the appropriate source material, except for Khrushchev's article, which is based on his personal recollections.

For the most part the articles are clearly written and can be understood [End Page 590] by readers lacking an in-depth knowledge of either the Eisenhower administration or defense-related terminology. Potential difficulties for nonspecialists may arise when the articles discuss the impact of either specific National Security Council documents or project names that readers may not be familiar with. Every article, however, except Hall's article on photoreconnaissance, avoids the use of jargon. Scholars interested in the Eisenhower administration or the development of national security organizations and policies during the Cold War era would benefit from reading this book. Also, those studying presidential policy-making would find it useful.

Wyndham Whynot
Livingstone College
Salisbury, North Carolina
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