Buffaloes Over Singapore: RAF, RAAF, RNZAF and Dutch Brewster Fighters in Action Over Malaya and the East Indies 1941-1942 (review)

While, paraphrasing Lord Wellington, it could be said "The Battle of Britain Was Won on the Flying Fields of England," I would add, after reading Buffaloes over Singapore, "The Battle of Singapore Was Lost on the Playing Fields of Malaya." I would also add, less in jest, that it's a first-rate primer on How Not To Fight An Air War. On 7 December 1941 no one in the know really expected the Japanese to attack British Malaya, this despite their demonstrated aggressiveness in China (1931–41) and French Indo-China (1940–41). And if they did attack, British Far East Command knew the four squadrons of newly arrived American-made Brewster Buffalo fighters, piloted by Royal Air Force, Royal Australian Air Force, and Royal New Zealand Air Force pilots would soon sweep the Japanese air fleet (1,000 strong) from the skies. Any air officer above flight lieutenant of course knew the Buffalo was not a first class "kite." It could not succeed against the Germans or even the Italians, but RAF Headquarters decided that against the poorly constructed canvas and paper, fourth-rate fighters the Japanese flew (per RAF Air Intelligence) the Buffalo "was good enough for Singapore." Some of the Buffalo's more prepubescent type fighter pilots even wanted the Japanese to attack as a few easy air kills, even against vastly inferior Orientals pilots (again per Air Intel), could only sharpen one's combat air skills while awaiting transfer to the "European War." And while waiting, you, the intel officers, and the command staff plotted promotion, partook of planter parties, played poker, or pillaged pliable prostitutes. Such "good life" military complacency ended on 8 December 1941.

Four hours before Pearl Harbor felt its first aerial bomb Japanese naval gunfire saturated Northeast Malaya's beaches. Despite even an Associated Press notice of a large Japanese convoy heading south, the British were caught by surprise. And then things went really, really bad, first in the air, then everywhere. A few episodes are noted here. Japanese pilots and aircraft were not fourth rate. Their pilots were well drilled, experienced, and aggressive. Their Zero fighter could out speed, out climb, and out turn the Buffalo. The heavier, carrier designed, Buffalo could out dive the Zero, but for a diving attack a pilot needed warning time to gain superior altitude. British radar deployed in Malaya would have given the Buffalo that advantage, but the radar sets were quickly moved far to the rear, "to protect its secret." The "secret" was saved, but not the slow-climbing Buffaloes and eventually British South East Asia. If your Buffalo did manage to climb, dive, and survive you often found your home under new management—Japanese. Panicky airfield evacuations were the rule. Kota Baru, the finest airfield in Northeast Malaya, fell to a sniper attack. Nearby Alor Star gave the Japanese 1,000 barrels of high-octane AV gas and tons of still-in-the-bunker bombs. Such "gifts," coupled with excellent pilots flying Zero fighters, enabled the Japanese to quickly gain air superiority over all of Malaya.

British air superiority might have been regained early on after a convoy battled its way to Singapore carrying 51 Hawker "Hurricane" fighters. Instead of sending the superb Hurricanes into battle en masse, the local air staff used them as Buffalo attrition replacements. Many still-crated Hurricanes, on Singapore's last day of battle, ended up being pushed off piers while overhead Buffaloes twisted and turned in unequal combat. It was not as if RAF Far East Command did not have enough pilots to fill empty Hurricane cockpits. Long after the Japanese gained air superiority over Singapore the local RAF air staff was still approving the sending of pilots there to be...