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  • Through Mobility We Conquer: The Mechanization of U.S. Cavalry
  • Alexander M. Bielakowski
Through Mobility We Conquer: The Mechanization of U.S. Cavalry. By George F. Hofmann. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2006. ISBN 978-0-8131-2403-2. Bibliography. Index. Maps. Notes. Photographs. Tables. Pp. xv, 578. $45.00.

Through Mobility We Conquer is, to date, the most significant scholarly work to focus exclusively on mechanization in the U.S. Cavalry from World War I through the abolition of the branch following World War II. While the topic has been covered peripherally in other works, George F. Hofmann deserves credit for presenting the importance of cavalry mechanization so prominently. Hofmann, an adjunct associate professor of history at the University of Cincinnati, is certainly one of the most appropriate individuals to write such a book, having previously written about the interwar period in U.S. military history and other closely related topics. His previous books include: Super Sixth: The History of the 6th Armored Division in World War II (originally published in 1975; reprinted by Battery Press in 2000); Cold War Casualty: The Court-Martial of Major General Robert W. Grow (Kent State University Press, 1993); and Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The History of U.S. Armored Forces (University Press of Kentucky, 1999), which he co-edited with General Donn A. Starry.

Through Mobility We Conquer focuses on two closely related historical events—the creation of the Office of the Chief of Cavalry (created by the National Defense Act of 1920 along with parallel branch chiefs for the other combat arms) and the appointment, in 1938, of John K. Herr as Chief of Cavalry. Hofmann rightly acknowledges the harm that branch parochialism did to the process of mechanization. In particular, the rivalry between the cavalry and infantry led to neither branch perfecting the use of tanks (which, though prohibited to the cavalry by the National Defense Act of 1920, were nevertheless purchased and simply redesignated "combat cars") or controlling their future after 1940 and the creation of the "Armored Force." As regards Major General Herr, I agree with Hofmann's general assessment and have no doubts that, had Adna R. Chaffee, Jr., Daniel Van Voorhis, or another pro-mechanization cavalry officer been appointed Chief of Cavalry in 1938, cavalry would have remained the principal maneuver branch of the U.S. Army. Hofmann is also to be commended for his sections on J. Walter Christie (about whom he previously published an article in Military Affairs, the precursor of the Journal of Military History) and the U.S. Constabulary.

Most of my criticisms of Through Mobility We Conquer are those of one specialist nitpicking the work of another specialist in the same field and, therefore, inappropriate to a public book review. Nevertheless, if I might be permitted a moment of vanity, Hofmann is to be appropriately criticized for his glaring bibliographic omission of one article and one dissertation (Bielakowski, Alexander M. "The Last Chief of Cavalry—Major General John K. Herr," Journal of America's Military Past 28 (Fall 2001): 67-82; and Bielakowski, Alexander M. "U.S. Army Cavalry Officers and the Issue of Mechanization, 1920 to 1942" [Ph.D. diss., Kansas State University, 2002]). Otherwise, Hofmann's book represents the best and most important work yet done on interwar cavalry mechanization and its effects on the U.S. Army in World War II. I highly recommend this book and find it hard to believe that it will be surpassed anytime soon.

Alexander M. Bielakowski
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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