In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

The Journal of Military History 70.4 (2006) 1168-1169


Reviewed by
Raymond W. Westphal, Jr.
Stavanger, Norway
The Royal Navy, 1930–2000: Innovation and Defence. Edited by Richard Harding. New York: Frank Cass, 2005. ISBN 0-7146-8581-X. Tables. Figures. Notes. Select bibliography. Index. Pp. xvi, 299. $38.95.

This collection of essays features papers which were presented at a conference entitled "Adapting to Change: The Royal Navy and the Maritime Industry 1850–1990," sponsored by the Society for Nautical Research, publishers of the Mariner's Mirror, and the British Commission for Maritime History. The essays examine various aspects of innovation within the Royal Navy from the 1930s through the Cold War era. As the editor, Professor Richard Harding, argues, this collection of essays is designed to follow the late Professor Bryan Ranft's Technical Change and British Naval Policy, 1860–1939 (1977) and examine the various issues which played direct roles in shaping British naval innovation and how the navy dealt with the numerous technological advances which emerged throughout the twentieth century.

As with any edited monograph, the strength of this one is based on the reputations of the contributors and, in this case, they include some of the leading academic and military authorities on Royal Navy and maritime history. Authors include Philip Pugh, a specialist on matters of cost and operational analysis for the defense industry and British government. His essay examines Operational Research (OR), which is the integration of existing systems by training and equates to effective technology. Richard Harding, professor at the University of Westminster and a specialist in organizational development and maritime history, examines the financial and technological aspects of amphibious warfare from 1930 through 1939. Commander David Hobbs, Curator and Principal Historian of the Fleet Air Arm Museum at Yeovilton, examines peacetime naval aviation and its developments during wartime. He argues that the rush to build warships and ignore technological developments left gaps in operational capability during the war and in maintaining modern fleet carriers in the postwar years.

Dr. Lewis Johnman, Principal Lecturer in History at the University of Westminster and Dr. Hugh Murphy, Lecturer at the University of Glasgow and specialist in business, banking, and maritime history, together offer an interesting essay examining the ship welding industry and explain how industrial organization hindered innovation. They argue that the failure of the ship welding industry to develop new technology lay in its poor industrial relations, weak management, and failure to invest in new technology during economic downturns. Lieutenant Commander W. J. R. Gardner, historian at the Naval Historical Branch (NHB) at the Ministry of Defense [End Page 1168] (MoD), examines how innovation in submarine detection (1939–45) and anti-ship warfare (ASW) depended on careful adaptation of technology and limited operational experience. Joining Gardner's essay on ASW issues is Lieutenant Commander Malcolm Llewellyn-Jones, a specialist in ASW and presently a historian at the NHB. His essay examines how the Royal Navy focused on defeating future submarine threats in the Far East (1944–54).

Anthony Gorst, Lecturer at the University of Westminster, examines the controversies surrounding the failures of the Admiralty to successfully complete CVA-01 (a postwar aircraft carrier) and how the Royal Navy tried and failed to jump a generation of technological developments between 1957 and 1966, which Gorst attributes to problems in financing and changing operational requirements. Dr. Eric Grove, Director of the Center for Security Studies at the University of Hull and leading scholar in modern British strategy and tactics, examines the history of guided missile technology in the Royal Navy and how diplomatic relations with the U.S. proved to be indispensable to the cash strapped Admiralty. Dr. Ian Speller, a specialist in post-1945 British foreign policy, defense and maritime strategy, and lecturer at the National University of Ireland, Maynooth examines British amphibious operations during World War II and how they initially succeeded with interservice collaboration and subsequently failed in the postwar years as the competing services fought over scarce resources and political standing. Professor...

pdf

Share