Hell in the Holy Land: World War I in the Middle East (review)

Scholarly interest in the war on the Western Front has overshadowed the peripheral theaters of the First World War. Thus, a volume from an acknowledged expert such as David Woodward on the Palestine campaign is to be welcomed. The book under review is a hybrid production; a blend of history "from below"—ordinary soldiers' and officers' accounts of the fighting and conditions generally—with a traditional account of the strategy and policy surrounding the campaign. The soldiers' accounts come from British archives—notably the Imperial War Museum—and are vivid and sharp; the examination of the senior echelons of command is both lucid and informed by the latest reading on the subject. The success of this volume lies in the skill with which Professor Woodward has merged the day-to-day experiences of soldiers with the decision making of the generals and politicians. What emerges is a well-informed, cohesive, chronological and multi-faceted critical narrative that, while not presenting any radical new thesis on the fighting in Palestine, will serve well as a standard text for students and general readers interested in the span of the campaign from 1914 to the war's end.

While the book contains no surprises, certain themes emerge that bear contemplation and further study. The impact of the physical environment on operations is striking. Not just water shortages and extremes of weather but also endemic disease (especially behind Turkish lines) weighed heavily on the men of the British-led Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF). For the poorly equipped soldier this was as much a battle against inclement weather and lack of water as it was a war against the Turks. Poor command and logistics compounded this unfortunate situation. This was a war of supply lines—echoes here, of course, of the war in the Western Desert in World War II—and victory was impossible without the railway and water pipeline built with Egyptian forced labor across the Sinai Peninsula. Again, after the collapse of the Turkish lines in November 1917 at the third battle of Gaza, the British pursuit was pulled back by an inability properly to supply the fighting troops. The arrival of General Allenby in June 1917 revived the faltering command structure of the EEF; indeed, the loss of nerve and lack of control by senior EEF generals largely explain the defeats at the first two battles of Gaza in March-April 1917. The narrative also puts paid to the idea that this was a cavalry war. In fact, cavalry charges, while dramatic, were the exception and often resulted in heavy casualties. Nor was pursuit by the ever-thirsty horses easy. You still needed the gunners and the infantry.

Woodward's soldiers are viewed in the round, including their drinking, their visits to brothels and their prejudice towards the local inhabitants. The volume is right to raise the issue of the harsh treatment meted out by the British to the Egyptians forced to labor behind the lines in appalling conditions building the supply lines so vital for success. If the volume does have any drawbacks (beyond the over-heated title), it is its emphasis on the British side of events. The stories of the Egyptians, Turks, and Imperial troops would have helped provide a fuller account. This was after all a clash of multinational, multicultural forces. The problem for any scholar is the fact that beyond the material in Australian and New Zealand archives, Turkish, Indian, and Egyptian personal accounts are very hard to come by. Access to Turkish archives is notoriously difficult, even for those favored by the government in Ankara. The work of Edward Erickson on the Turks has helped fill this gap but any account such as the one under review is necessarily one-sided.

This is an impressive, critical and readable volume that provides fascinating personal insights woven in with...