Lincoln's Tragic Admiral: The Life of Samuel Francis Du Pont (review)

Until a few years ago almost all books about the Civil War dealt with fighting on land. This has changed with the appearance of a number of fine studies treating naval battles, ships, seamen, and commanders. Add to this growing list a fine biography of Rear Admiral Samuel Francis Du Pont by Kevin Weddle of the U.S. Army War College.

In 1861, Captain Du Pont was a veteran of forty-six years of naval service. He was best known for having chaired the 1855 Naval Efficiency Board that eliminated much deadwood from the officer corps. In his discussion of this episode, Weddle makes a strong case for the importance to the navy of the 1855 Naval Efficiency Act. As chair of the Efficiency Board, Du Pont established his reputation as a reformer. Weddle also stresses Du Pont's deserved reputation as an advocate of new technology in a service often reluctant to embrace change.

Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles thought enough of Du Pont at the beginning of the war to appoint him as chair of the Commission on Conference, popularly known as the Blockade Board. This was a critical assignment, as the board set all Union naval strategy. Then in September 1861, Du Pont took command of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron. Two months later, he commanded the largest fleet in U.S. Navy history to that point in the successful capture of Port Royal, South Carolina, which then became a major Union naval base. Promoted to rear admiral in July 1862, Du Pont then directed the much more difficult Union effort to capture Charleston.

Weddle's treatment of Du Pont's attack on Charleston in April 1863 is deftly handled and his assessment of Du Pont's role in that abortive operation seems both judicious and fair. Weddle points out that in fact the task of trying to take Charleston with naval forces alone was an impossible one, given the limitations of the slow-firing Union monitors. Du Pont was correct in his belief that a combined operation with the land forces was the only way success could be achieved against the formidable Confederate forts. Secretary Welles and Assistant Secretary of the Navy Gustavus Fox simply did not understand the reality of the situation. At the same time, Weddle makes clear that Du Pont was his own worst enemy in the way he handled criticism of his actions and that this played a major role in his subsequent relief.

Weddle's book is well written and makes extensive use of the relevant primary and secondary sources. He provides new insight into Du Pont's roles on both the Naval Efficiency Board and the Blockade Board. One interesting aspect is the author's discussion of Du Pont's change in attitude toward slavery, the consequence of what he discovered in the South. While this book appears intended primarily for naval history specialists and college and university libraries, it will no doubt also appeal to a growing number of Civil War naval enthusiasts.