Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art (review)

Operational art is a relatively modern bit of nomenclature that pertains to the ancient custom of war. The expression has many definitions, but all revolve around the process of planning and executing campaigns—a linked series of tactical engagements and battles—in order to achieve strategic goals. Simply put, operational art determines when, where, and for what purposes large formations fight. This collection introduces the concept and illustrates its application from Napoleon's exploits to Desert Storm. Clearly designed for professional soldiers studying at staff colleges, the volume emits a distinctly utilitarian whiff. Nevertheless, civilian scholars and students of military history will find much of interest here also.

An introductory essay provides necessary background. As a working construct, operational art originated with Soviet military theorists in the 1920s and 1930s. Grappling with the drastically changed nature of armed conflict as reflected in World War I and their own revolution, these thinkers created the term, along with a sophisticated intellectual underpinning. The Red Army subsequently translated theory into practice during the last two years of the Great Patriotic War while mercilessly hammering the Germans from Stalingrad to Berlin. A generation later, the U.S Army seized upon the idea of an operational level of warfare as part of its post-Vietnam renaissance and enshrined it in its manuals. Today, operational art is firmly established in U.S. joint service doctrine.

The rest of the book consists of four sections, which treat French, German, Russian/Soviet, and American thought and experience at the operational level. The individual chapters—fourteen of them—are of uniformly high quality, as one would expect from an impressive roster of contributors that boasts Napoleonic Wars expert David Chandler; the former head of the West Point history department, Brigadier General (retired) Robert Doughty; and the late Professor Russell Weigley. Among the more significant operational thinkers and doers profiled is a trio of Germans: Helmuth von Moltke (the elder), Alfred von Schlieffen, and Erich von Manstein, as well as the Soviet Mikhail Tukhachevsky. Campaign analyses include Jena-Auerstädt, Gettysburg, the German 1940 breakthrough at Sedan, the Anglo-American experience on and beyond the beaches in Normandy, the American disaster in North Korea in late 1950, and the American triumph in Kuwait some forty years later.

A brief "Afterword" reiterates the work's scope and purpose, and usefully warns U.S. military commanders—and, by extension, their political masters—not to become enamored of either technological wizardry or short-term tactical successes at the expense of well-thought out operational designs that actually accomplish broad strategic aims. Perhaps in our current situation, what might be even more useful for the Army's historical think tank is to assemble a compilation that provides insight into thwarting terrorists, defeating insurgents, and securing and reconstructing failed or failing states.