Dr. Gat Responds

The purpose of the article is not to describe in the minutest detail the story of the Israeli Air Force, but rather to analyze the operation of the IAF in a broader context of relations between Israel and its neighbors. The article is a discussion and analysis of the impact of the IAF on the processes that led to the Six-Day War. Comment or criticism cannot be based on a narrow perspective without considering the overall context and orientation of the research as intended by the author. Therefore it is not surprising that Mr. Elron states that there is use of irrelevant source material or that I ignore many other sources. I am convinced that Mr. Elron would permit use of sources that assist in clarifying the thesis of the article. The use of available material dates to the year 2000, not 1999, as he stated in his first comments.

Is the use of the Public Record Office, or the National Archives in Washington, D.C., or the Israel State Archive irrelevant? The one-sided conclusion that the article lacks foundation may, one can assume, be appropriate to the perspective of Mr. Elron and others. Yet, it is unclear how many are "many new publications." Does this include the sources cited in his third footnote or many beyond these? Why does he believe that the material cited in this comment is so relevant to the article at hand? The book on Levi Eshkol published in 2002 under the editorship of Lammfromm and Tzoref can contribute nothing whatsoever to the article. The volume is no more than a collection of documents, and introductory material that can hardly be defined as genuine scientific research.

To the best of my knowledge, Ami Gluska's doctoral thesis was classified. It was published as a book, in an abridged and censored form I imagine, but only recently—several months ago at most. The publicized content within the published work does not appear to be germane to the article's objectives in any case, and this lack of relevancy is echoed in Shteigman's book as well—a work I read in preliminary draft form prior to publication.

The IDF, whose historical development begins in the pre-State period (see my article in Maarachot No. 304, June 1986), is in a perpetual process of change from an organizational and structural standpoint as well as, of course, acquisition of aircraft. Prior to the Sinai Campaign there was an accelerated process afoot to procure aircraft capable of meeting the dangers of impending war, along with a policy of changes in the composition of the IDF's fleet of aircraft. However, a genuine program for building an advanced air power capability received tremendous momentum with the appointment of Ezer Weizman as Commander of the Air Force (see my article in the anthology, A Decade of Disquiet). This impetus cannot be separated from the overall strategy that began to crystallize in Israel after the Sinai Campaign. Despite the failures that Mr. Elron cites, the IAF demonstrated a capability in the course of the Campaign. The attitude of the political leadership towards the air force changed. Over time, as part of an ongoing process, the IAF was transformed into an important pillar of Israeli defense policy. It is impossible to explain the impressive performance of the air force in the Six-Day War without recognizing the preparations and tremendous momentum in building up Israel's air power in the years that preceded the war, or to be more precise—in the period during which Ezer Weizman served as Commander of the Air Force—1958–66.

One can argue about the presentation or absence of this or that data, but one cannot discount the use of the biographies of personalities who played a key role at the time. There is a serious attempt on Mr. Elron's part to sit in judgment as to what is true and what is not true. Does Mr. Elron...