In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

Reviewed by:
  • Portugal 1914–1926: From the First World War to Military Dictatorship
  • John P. Cann
Portugal 1914–1926: From the First World War to Military Dictatorship. By Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses. Bristol, U.K.: Hispanic, Portuguese, and Latin American Monographs, University of Bristol, 2004. ISBN 0-86292-555-X. Maps. Photographs. Notes. Bibliography. Pp. xx, 284. £35.00.

Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses takes an original look at why Portugal, neither a rich nor a well-developed country and one governed in complete political and financial chaos at the time, undertook three different and widely separated campaigns in the First World War. In each of the three cases the troops were poorly trained and equipped, ill-supported in their continuing fights, and a burden to any nearby Allies that might be trying to defeat the Germans. These flaws universally resulted in ineffectual performance and a high rate of casualties both from disease and combat. While there were many incidents of individual and unit heroism, the overall result was dismal, and [End Page 853] the national goals of the enterprise were never realized. As a result Portugal was never taken seriously by its European neighbors and suffered accordingly. The volume is strongly recommended for students of Portuguese politics during the period of transition from the monarchy to the Salazar regime and the political rationale for the martial undertakings during this period. It is a well crafted work that draws on extensive primary sources and secondary research, and is lucidly written despite its labyrinthine topic.

The purpose of the book is to explain how the Portuguese entry into the First World War was seen by its government, first as a shortcut to popular acceptance by its European neighbors, and second as a means to secure its colonial interests. As it evolved, this national strategy was ill-considered, poorly executed, and not surprisingly achieved none of its goals.

Portugal was and remained an impoverished nation. Although Lisbon had been in the first half of the sixteenth century a spectacularly opulent city, Portugal as a whole did not produce enough goods to feed and clothe its population at the time, and staples had to be purchased abroad. Slaves were imported from the Guinean Coast to supply labor while rural Portuguese emigrated to western Spain in search of employment. The wealth of Lisbon seemed useless to the population at large. Portugal never developed a domestic economy of any consequence and thus when the wealth of India, Africa, and Brazil melted away, there was no alternative to stagnation at home. The Portuguese economy persisted at subsistence levels, failing even to participate significantly in the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century. By the early twentieth century and the First World War it still could neither feed nor clothe its population and depended on imports and credit from its European neighbors, particularly Great Britain, to function as a country. From the outside it was viewed as unable to govern itself in a civilized way with its coups, assassinations, and political imprisonments that resulted in some thirty changes in government during the period examined.

The misplaced notion of becoming a belligerent alongside the Allies was born in September 1914, when the French requested that Portugal supply a number of French-manufactured 75mm field guns for the Flanders front. The Portuguese position was that if the Allies wanted the guns, then they must accept Portugal as a co-belligerent and the presence of a Portuguese division on the Western Front. Ultimately it evolved that the guns would not be useful, as they were not compatible with similar weapons in the French inventory, and as delays in getting them to France would make them irrelevant. Nevertheless, Portugal insisted on sending a reinforced division that was unaffordable, that could be destroyed in a single day of fighting, that would have no significant impact on the outcome of the war, and that would place a burden on its Allies because of its low state of readiness. After a long and sad drama, all of these weaknesses proved true, and despite individual bravery of the troops involved, Portugal had not improved its political position in the least. Nowhere was this more evident than in...

pdf

Share