Responsibility of Command: How UN and NATO Commanders Influenced Airpower over Bosnia (review)

WARNING! THIS BOOK MAY CAUSE STRONG MEN TO WEEP! The author, USAF Colonel Mark A. Bucknam, is not to blame. He succeeds admirably in explaining the conflicting requirements of mission accomplishment and force protection imposed on both the UN ground commanders and the NATO air commanders in Bosnia between April 1993 and September 1995 and how those conflicting requirements brought UN and NATO commanders into paralyzing disagreement in a situation already fraught with ambivalent attitudes toward the warring Bosnian factions, the lack of clear policy objectives and guidance, cumbersome coordination and decision-making systems, inadequate understanding of the use of modern airpower, and hypersensitivity to force protection. But in so doing, he exposes the inadequacies of the UN peace-keeping apparatus which led to abandonment of the "safe area" policy and the subsequent massacre of thousands of Muslims by the Bosnian Serbs at Srbrenica in July 1995.

Under the so-called "dual key" system used to coordinate the use of NATO airpower in Bosnia, the approval of the UN ground commander was required for all air operations. Although subject to the often ambiguous decisions of the North Atlantic Council, the NATO air commanders, mostly Americans, were well prepared to employ modern airpower to achieve publicly stated UN/NATO objectives. However, the successive Belgian, French, and British UN ground commanders in Bosnia, up to the assignment of British Lieutenant General Rupert Smith in 1995, were set in their ways, unfamiliar with or skeptical about the use of modern airpower, reluctant to take any action which might produce civilian casualties or place their admittedly inadequate forces in danger of retaliation, and inclined to refer every decision to UN headquarters in New York. At every turn, they acted to stymie the application of NATO airpower and, in the case of British Lieutenant General Sir Michael Rose, even tipped off the Bosnian Serb commanders as to the time, place, and exact target of planned NATO airstrikes.

The cracks in the UN peacekeeping system and in the NATO alliance revealed by Colonel Bucknam's story do not augur well for the future, especially as regards United States participation in either organization. As he reveals, the United States armed forces have developed the forces and doctrine of modern warfare far beyond the ability of our allies to keep up, thereby creating an imbalance in capabilities and doctrine which could inhibit cooperation in any future conflict.

Colonel Bucknam's style is sometimes convoluted, and the detailed review of the literature and of airpower theory contained in the first two chapters could easily have been omitted. However, any minor stylistic defects are more than compensated for by the depth of his research, especially the interviews with all of the principal UN and NATO participants. His exhaustive chapter notes and the seventy-page bibliography will be a rich mine for other scholars for years to come.

On the whole, this book is highly recommended for readers interested in airpower, NATO, UN peace-keeping, and the situation in Bosnia. It is sometimes heavy going, but is well worth the effort.