Technology and Naval Combat in the Twentieth Century and Beyond (review)

This is a stimulating collection of essays by some of today's leading naval historians, divided into four sections: preparations for World War I, rearming prior to World War II, the Cold War, and preparing for the next war. Although the scholarship is of high standard throughout, the book is organized chronologically and by nationality rather than by technologies, and thus to some extent fails to deliver the promise of its title. Nevertheless, the diligent reader will find a number of technology-related themes appearing throughout the work, demonstrating how much commonality there is across time periods and nations in the key material factors that determine success or failure in naval warfare.

Navies are extraordinarily expensive, and several chapters demonstrate that a nation's capability with respect to naval technology is largely a function of its economic strength. A vivid example of the naval/economic power relationship is Japan: the late David C. Evans shows how accelerated economic development prior to World War I enabled its navy to grow from insignificance to the world's third largest. Mark Peattie then describes how the same nation lacked the economic and technical strength to survive an extended war with the United States. Domestic politics also influence spending levels and thus adoption of new technologies: Paul Halpern describes how the Jeune École of the 1880s politicized French naval procurement.

Arguably no navy has attained material superiority without first producing a politically powerful naval strategist. The book's success stories include Japan's Yamamoto Gombei and Togo, architects of the victory over Russia in 1905; America's Mahan; and Britain's "Jackie" Fisher, the latter's reputation being given a refreshing new look in a chapter by Nicholas Lambert that builds on earlier revisionist work by John Sumida. Others, such as Germany's Tirpitz and Raeder, were less successful; more recently, as Evan Mawdsley recounts, Soviet Admiral Gorshkov attempted the impossible when setting out to build a world-class blue water fleet on a third class economic base.

Concluding chapters contemplate the future, including the continuing role of navies as important tools of diplomacy, although cost considerations will dictate fewer platforms and increasing use of design and manufacturing technology adapted from commercial production. Norman Friedman points out how new technology may dramatically change platform missions, as was the case with the Tomahawk's revitalization of the United States surface fleet.

Books assembled from papers delivered at a conference often prove frustrating reading, and apparently this volume was the product of such a process, though this reviewer could find no reference in the text to a related academic gathering. Anyone with an interest in naval history will benefit from reading this book. However, its value would have been greatly increased had the editor done more to connect the accounts of developing technologies presently scattered throughout these excellent chapters, and provided the reader with an index that included some of the vital technical developments of the period, such as aircraft, turbines, radio and radar. It was also distressing to find him using more than once in a scholarly naval work the phrase "knots per hour."