The Beast Was Out There: The 28th Infantry Black Lions and the Battle of Ong Thanh, Vietnam, October 1967 (review)

James E. Shelton's The Beast Was Out There is a fascinating work. It is much more than a veteran's account of a single battle of the Vietnam War. The book is part memoir, part unit history, part biography, and finally an insightful analysis of the nature of battle.

Shelton's narrative form has a rather complex structure. In his semi-autobiographical first chapter, the author observes that both World War II and the Korean War provided the historical framework for his childhood and adolescence. Graduating from high school in 1953, he played football at the University of Delaware and enrolled there in the Army ROTC program. Commissioned in 1957 as a second lieutenant, he became a career Army officer. He served in Vietnam in 1967 as a major and retired several years later with the rank of brigadier general. Shelton ends the chapter stating that the objective of his book is "to recount how the U.S. 1st Infantry Division [The Big Red One] forced the VC to stand and fight a tactical battle at Ong Thanh" [p. 9]. This is not the story of an American victory, but rather a multifaceted perspective on the defeat of the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry (Black Lions) at the hands of the 271st Regiment of the 9th Viet Cong Division.

Before addressing his main theme, however, the author dedicates nearly half the book to the framework for his narrative. Following his opening chapter, Shelton gives a brief history of both the 1st Infantry Division and the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry. In a straightforward account, he discusses the experience of the division in Vietnam with a focus on commanders and division tactics and operating procedures. He then devotes eight chapters to his own experience as the operations officer of the 2d Battalion from June until October 1967. He was reassigned to the division operations staff on 3 October, two weeks before the battle of Ong Thanh, located in an isolated jungled sector near the Michelin Plantation north of Saigon.

While the preceding is well told and lays a solid foundation, Shelton does not come to the crux of his narrative until Chapter 14. First, he describes the battle from his vantage point at the time as a member of the Division G-3 staff. He follows this initial description with a portrayal from various other viewpoints, including key division and brigade commanders, the surviving officers of the battalion, as well as several enlisted men. Shelton has exploited multiple sources: unit records, oral histories, personal interviews and secondary works including George McGarrigle's excellent account in his official history (Taking the Offensive, October 1966 to October 1967 [Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1998], 353-61). Moreover, the author has thoroughly plowed the CMH files relating to the battle. In his final chapters, Shelton offers perceptive vignettes of several of the key personalities and a brief epilogue with his final thoughts about the battle. In his analyses, Shelton is almost brutally frank. While pointing no fingers at anyone, he remarks upon the need of commanders and subordinate officers to be able to communicate and listen to one another, upon "the failure to use fire and maneuver . . . effectively" (p. 226), and upon the restrictive division Standard Operating Procedures. His most telling criticism, however, occurs at the end of his own account of the battle in Chapter 14: "I believe that the 2-28 Infantry was expecting to be hit by the VC on October 17, 1967. They fully expected a combat action, and it was really a...