The Influence of Air Power upon History (review)

Attempting to write a worldwide history of airpower's impact over the past century is a daunting task. Yet, Walter Boyne is one of the most respected and prolific of airpower historians (author of three dozen books), a retired military pilot, and former Director of the National Air and Space Museum. His effort is successful, and although some will cavil at the scarce footnotes and lack of "scholarly tone," this book will now be the standard text on the subject.

Boyne borrows his title from Alfred Thayer Mahan, whose similar work on sea power had great influence a century ago. As Mahan did for sea power, so Boyne posits key factors that have shaped airpower's influence within a given country: (1) the size of the military budget and the air force's share of that budget; (2) each nation's perception of the threats to its security; (3) the level of aviation technology; (4) the politics of the rulers; and (5) the small number of influential people in the air force command structures during key periods. Using these factors as guideposts, Boyne examines the wars of the past century and airpower's role in them. In addition, he seeks to demonstrate the influence of airpower in politics, diplomacy, technology, and mass culture. This is a tall order.

Boyne states that airpower has not only revolutionized war, but has also revolutionized industry "with its demand for precision production and with the continual introduction of new and complex systems to make aircraft more effective" (p. 21). Further, he argues that airpower has had an even greater influence on policy than it has on war—generally as a deterrent or due to its coercive effects. Boyne amply demonstrates the revolutionary impact of airpower on war, but his other premises are more asserted than proven. Yet, it is hard to argue with the logic of airpower's influence (and that of space as well), on everyday life. Who today can imagine travel solely by railroad or ship, or the absence of cell phones, satellite television, and the Internet?

Heavier-than-air flight began with the Wright brothers in 1903, and Boyne emphatically rejects all opinion to the contrary, dismissing other claimants as frauds, liars, or inept copycats. Yet, the genius of the brothers in solving the two problems of in-flight control and a suitable engine was highly perishable: within a decade of their first flight, the Wright brothers had already been passed by and their designs made obsolete. Also remarkable is how quickly the airplane was adapted for use in war—in 1911 the Italians used aircraft in Libya against the Turks in virtually all of what would become the traditional missions: close air support, interdiction, bombing, reconnaissance, and airlift.

In World War I the airplane quickly proved decisive in its reconnaissance role. At both the Marne and Tannenberg aerial reports of enemy movements proved vital to victory. If either battle had gone the other way, the course of the war would have been totally altered.

During the interwar years three men, Giulio Douhet (Italy), Hugh Trenchard (Britain), and Billy Mitchell (the U.S.) articulated doctrines of airpower that were to have profound effects on World War II. Basing their ideas more on theory than on history—there was little experience then available—these doctrines were wrong in important respects; yet, they were also correct enough in the main to shape the conduct and outcome of the war. Boyne argues that airpower was decisive in several key campaigns: France, Norway, Crete, the Battle of Britain, the Battle of the Atlantic, Coral Sea, and Midway. Moreover, strategic bombing caused Japanese surrender, and airpower "enabled the ground forces of the United States and its allies to win the war in Europe" (p. 273). These conclusions will find some dissenters, as will...