In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

The Journal of Military History 67.4 (2003) 1316-1318



[Access article in PDF]
December 8, 1941: MacArthur's Pearl Harbor. By William H. Bartsch. College Station: Texas A&M Press, 2003. ISBN 1-58544-1. Photographs. Appendixes. Notes. Sources. Index. Pp. viii, 557. $40.00.

On December 8 (Philippine time), 1941, ten hours after Japanese planes [End Page 1316] had struck a devastating blow at Pearl Harbor, another large force of bombers and fighters made an equally punishing attack on Clark and Iba airfields in the Philippines. That assault not only wiped out nearly half of the American Far East Air Force (FEAF) and removed whatever offensive threat it might have posed to Japanese ambitions, but it also precipitated a fierce controversy over who on the American side might be blamed for this crippling defeat. In this impressive description and analysis of "MacArthur's Pearl Harbor," William H. Bartsch offers persuasive answers as well as a detailed picture of the confusion and frustration that beset American airmen and their commanders on that fateful day.

His book is essentially the story of individuals, based on extensive interviews and correspondence with both American and Japanese veterans as well as on documentary sources on both sides. Most of the text covers events and developments leading up to the actual attack: American plans to defend the Philippines and the buildup of airpower in the islands to support them; Japanese strategy and preparations; and especially the activities of American and Japanese flyers as they readied themselves for combat. The focus on individuals is particularly manifest in Bartsch's culminating description of the events of 8 December. In a dramatic, almost minute-by-minute account, he follows the specific actions of people on both sides, in the air and on the ground. Most of this material has not appeared in print before, and the difficulties and intensity of combat emerge far more clearly than in any previous account. Detailed appendixes include information on American and Japanese air strength, orders of battle, and personnel.

Bartsch states his conclusions about personal American culpability in the Japanese success early and succinctly. General MacArthur and his chief of staff, Brig. General Richard Sutherland, bear most of the responsibility. Despite their knowledge of the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor and early enemy strikes against other Philippine targets, as well as MacArthur's mandated responsibility to attack Formosan airfields once hostilities began, they took no immediate action to respond. Indeed, not withstanding his repeated efforts, FEAF commander Maj. General Lewis Brereton was not allowed to speak directly with MacArthur until late in the morning, when his urgent requests to bomb Formosa were finally granted—too late, however, for his bombers to be readied before the Japanese attackers struck.

Bartsch's only criticism of Brereton is that he "may have deferred too much" to his operational commanders (p. 416), and some of those officers indeed failed to perform adequately. Bartsch particularly indicts Major Orrin Grover, the 24th Pursuit Group commander, for mishandling his squadrons and making other mistakes, and lays primary tactical responsibility on him for the heavy loss of bombers and fighters.

Yet whatever errors were made in the Philippines, Bartsch argues that they were overshadowed by major failings in Washington. Building an offensive aerial capability with the B-17s without providing adequate defenses—newer fighters and dive-bombers, well-trained pilots, a proper air warning [End Page 1317] system, and modern antiaircraft artillery—doomed FEAF from the start. This illuminating book effectively details the tragedy that followed.



Stanley L. Falk
Alexandria, Virginia

...

pdf

Share