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The Journal of Military History 67.3 (2003) 966-967



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US Intelligence Perceptions of Soviet Power, 1921-1946. By Leonard Leshuk. Portland, Oreg.: Frank Cass, 2003. ISBN 0-7146-5306-3. Notes. References and sources. Index. Pp. xii, 284. $64.50.

This book argues that serious deficiencies in intelligence capabilities and methods combined with an unimaginative and complacent foreign policy to lead American policy makers to misperceive seriously economic, military, and political conditions inside the Soviet Union in the period 1921 to 1946. In particular, Washington consistently underestimated the degree to which Soviet social and economic policies were contrived to enhance the strength of the Red Army and Air Force. Misled by poor intelligence and constrained by lame policy, American leaders concluded that the Soviet Union was weak when in fact it had, throughout the 1930s, covertly accumulated the industrial and military resources that would allow the Stalinist regime to demolish German armies in World War II and challenge the United States for supremacy in the postwar world.

The author, an independent intelligence analyst, brings a fresh and critical perspective to the subject of Soviet-American relations. His insights, especially with regard to the militarization of Soviet industrial policy, are often illuminating. Specialists might quibble about some of his observations. This reviewer, for example, thinks that the author exaggerates the influence on Franklin Roosevelt's policy toward the Soviet Union of individuals who acted as spies or agents of influence for Moscow. It is unlikely that this policy would have been much different even if the New Deal had been free of such agents. The author also seems too ready to contrast a far-sighted, purposeful, and rational Soviet regime with a series of indecisive, unfocused, and blinkered Washington administrations. Again, it is unlikely that Stalin and his minions were any less susceptible to the vagaries of chance, misinformation, poor judgment, and bureaucratic politics than their counterparts in Washington.

A bigger question mark hangs over the author's portrayal of American intelligence in the interwar period. He accepts the traditional view that in this period American intelligence was enfeebled and neglected by military and political masters indifferent to the uses and methods of intelligence, blinded by social and racial prejudices, and miserly in the provision of resources. In fact, Robert Angevine, Thomas Mahnken, and others have challenged this stereotype and introduced a more nuanced view of American intelligence capabilities between the world wars. These "revisionists" argue convincingly that American intelligence often performed credibly despite its limited resources. One might ask, therefore, why that performance was so poor against the Soviet target. The author's suggestion that racial and social stereotyping, unimaginative policies, and the target's impenetrable security contributed to the failure seems inadequate since the same elements characterized the more successful collection efforts against Japan. Reference to the broader intelligence context would have made a good book better. As it [End Page 966] is the book will interest students of Soviet-American relations and the intelligence history of the interwar period.

 



David Alvarez
Saint Mary's College of California
Moraga, California

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