Research, Realpolitik, and Development in Korea: The State and the Green Revolution (review)

192Journal ofKorean Studies strong among Koreans, and was made much of in the last writings of the late L. George Paik, himself a cultural nationalist. In this connection, one might wish for some modification of the charge that "shrinking from confrontation with the colonial authorities belied [the cultural nationalists'] commitment to Gandhian nationalism and tactics" (p. 76). It might rather indicate considerable differences between Indian and Korean nationalist contexts. Indian nationalists, including Gandhi, were able to go much further than their Korean counterparts in their dealings with the colonial rulers without being charged with opportunism or compromise. Direct comparison between the surface nationalisms of the two countries is not particularly helpful, and in this case could well call into question all the arguments (and I think they are mostly valid ones) in this and other writings concerning the impracticability of Korean cultural nationalism . Clearly, Robinson has written a stimulating book, an undispensable addition to the libraries of all who study modern Korea. His arguments are clearly put and aptly supported by his sources. It is one of the frustrations of Western scholars of Korea that Englishlanguage monographs on specific aspects of modern Korean history are so few. There is no doubt a great deal more to be said about the role of cultural nationalism in Korea, and we owe Professor Robinson our gratitude for providing a fine basis for further discussion. Kenneth Wells Indiana University Research, Realpolitik, and Development in Korea: The State and the Green Revolution. By Larry L. Burmeister. Boulder: Westview Press, 1988. Pp. xiii, 200. Index. This book is about agricultural research in a newly industrializing country (NIC), the Republic of Korea. It is about the research and extension of agricultural technology, and the organization and authority relations surrounding the Office of Rural Development (ORD). It utilizes surveys, interviews, and secondary sources to examine the process of technical change and state-society relations. It is an excellent account ofhow technical change is administered by the state without much influence from the farmers in a nation going through Book Reviews193 rapid industrialization. It also discusses in detail the organizational structure of the ORD, how it is situated within the national government , and how it is related to other provincial and local agricultural agencies. Burmeister's study shows how extensive state control has been in the agricultural sector, and how state power transcends market power in determining the agricultural research agenda. The Office of Rural Development was established in 1962, "not induced from below by local and/or popular pressures on government officials for new approaches to increasing productive capacity" (p.44). It was created by high-ranking government officials with the national development plan in mind, but with little regard of the needs and demands of the farmers. The surveys and interviews with people in various agricultural agencies showed that the research agenda and money allocation were centrally controlled by the state. The findings also showed that the agricultural research agencies were unable to develop and plan their research projects based on their analysis of the market and the demands of the farmers. The researchers were often cut off from the farmers, because they were controlled by the state and were asked to conduct research that benefited the national development plans and not necessarily the farmers, and also because they had very little class ties with the farmers. Similarly, the rice self-sufficiency program in the 1970s was to support the national industrialization project, and not to respond to the needs of the farmers. The newly developed high-yielding rice variety, "Tongil" was promoted forcefully and rapidly by the state to bring rice self-sufficiency, with a mandate from President Park Chung Hee himself. This was promoted despite widespread discontent from the rural areas. Strong discontent was voiced by farmers because Tongil had higher input costs in terms of fertilizers and water , and required intensive management; was more prone to diseases and crop failure in harsh weather; was more difficult to integrate with other crops for the double-crop system; and its quality and taste was not as good as that of the other rice varieties. Consequently, the introduction and diffusion ofTongil did not increase rice production, but...