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  • The Return of the Amami Islands: The Reversion Movement and U.S.-Japan Relations
  • Dennis T. Yasutomo (bio)
The Return of the Amami Islands: The Reversion Movement and U.S.-Japan Relations. By Robert D. Eldridge. Lexington Books, Lanham, Md., 2004. xxx, 223 pages. $80.00.

For Robert E. Eldridge, the reversion of the Amami Islands to Japan by the United States in 1953 represents a laudable example of U.S.-Japan comity built upon mutual self-interest and high idealism. The study reflects in-depth and extensive research conducted primarily by combing through primary materials carefully to unearth the details and nuances found in official documents, private papers, and memoirs. Obviously, Eldridge loves digging into these historical materials, both Japanese and American, in order to reconstruct events and policy decisions from the perspective, to the extent possible, of the protagonists and policymakers. He does it well, as he takes us into strategy meetings in Washington and Tokyo, and recounts almost blow [End Page 248] by blow the give and take of both Japanese and American deliberations. Eldridge praises nearly everyone involved in the reversion process, including visionary Amami leaders and astute American policymakers, for making a common-sense, "natural, albeit belated" correct decision (p. 149).

As the Allied occupation of Japan came to an end in 1952, Japan sought the return of sovereignty of three island groups under U.S. administration since the Japanese surrender. The U.S. eventually restored full sovereignty to Japan over the Ogasawara (Bonin) Islands in 1968 and the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa) in 1972. The United States returned the Amami Islands in 1953. Eldridge concludes that the early reversion is explained by a combination of "one of the most successful sociopolitical movements in postwar Japan" (p. 31) and the victory of the U.S. State Department in its struggle with the military to implement the principles of the 1941 Atlantic Charter (self-determination and rejection of territorial aggrandizement).

Eldridge presents two parallel processes in one, reflected in separate chapters for the Japanese and American sides of the story. On the Japanese side, we see a citizens' movement shaping Japanese policies through tight organization, effective leadership, a high level of public and media support, and an alliance, stretching over successive cabinets, with elite policymakers, including Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru and Foreign Minister Ashida Hitoshi. On the American side, we see the State Department prevailing against the military (National Security Council) as it attempts to use the reversion to better bilateral relations, forestall Japanese demands for the return of Okinawa, induce the remilitarization of Japan, and, at the same time, uphold the principles of the charter. President Dwight D. Eisenhower makes a brief, but important, appearance, but it is Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and high-level State Department officials and U.S. ambassadors to Japan who carry the day.

The book provides a good picture of civil society activism early in Japan's fledging democracy. Eldridge claims that the movement managed to extend its influence not only to the halls of power in Tokyo but also into American policymaking considerations. He paints a picture of an "inside-out" process whereby Japan was not a subservient and reactive partner of the United States despite the asymmetrical relationship forged at the time under the occupation. The Japanese government, bolstered by popular support and interest groups, had clear objectives and a reversion strategy that went beyond the return of the Amami Islands to other territories not under Japanese control. Japan, in other words, skillfully attained its political and diplomatic objectives through grass-roots interest groups, bipartisanship in the political world, a general united front nationally, and a patient but determined government.

The American side reveals a case study of bureaucratic politics. That the State Department sought to maintain and promote strong bilateral political [End Page 249] ties and the military concentrated on strategic interests is not a surprising finding. The State Department's deliberations and thinking receive more detailed coverage, probably based on the greater availability of research materials, but there are some questions about whether the divide between the State Department and military was so consistently clear-cut. For example, Eldridge notes that the military...

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