Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder after 1914 (review)

This study of information gathering in the British and French dependencies of the Middle East and North Africa during the interwar period focuses on questions facing all colonial administrators—where and how did they acquire the data on which to base their decisions, and how accurate and objective were their sources? The colonial enterprise depended on sound intelligence, accurately interpreted and rapidly transmitted to those in a position to use it effectively. The information collected had the potential to improve the quality of local life, and its accumulation was often justified in those terms, but its much more common usage was simply to advance colonial agendas. Urban policemen, rural tribal administrators, and numerous informants were the cogs in this system, relaying information ranging from statistical data on health, agriculture, and meteorological conditions to assessments of the power residing in tribal federations and of the influence wielded by such emergent institutions as political parties and labor unions in urban areas. The challenges of employing coercive measures in regions where imperial control was stretched thin underscored the importance of the intelligence services as a first line of defense.

Presenting this book as the first comparative study on intelligence gathering, Thomas paints on a broad canvas—from Morocco to Iraq, from Syria to Sudan. The archival material about colonial intelligence is voluminous, and he has mined it extensively. His apparent intention to leave no stone unturned in describing imperial intelligence networks results in a cluttered landscape that reveals parallels and connections among divergent regions but often obscures profound differences.

World War I heightened the importance of intelligence, but the gathering and assessing of information had been underway in these dependencies for many years. Thomas discusses the evolution of intelligence processes, including the increased utilization of technology, beginning in the late nineteenth century. He also describes the forerunners of the “Empires of Intelligence.” For the British, India provided a model, as did the World War I–era Arab Bureau. For the French, the Bureaux Arabes and Services des Renseignements offered similar early examples of successful intelligence organizations.

No matter how well trained or well qualified the intelligence agents were, it was impossible to guarantee that their reports would be analyzed effectively or put to appropriate uses. The deliberate distortion of information or the suppression of data that did not accord with their superiors’ views could create serious problems, as revealed in the intelligence failure that occurred when British officials in Baghdad altered reports from agents in Kurdistan in the early years of the mandate in order to promote their vision of Iraq’s future. In some instances, however, agents in the field missed the obvious. Their frequent obsession all across the region with Bolshevism and pan-Islam during the 1920s blinded them to the more pertinent problems posed by the growth of labor and secular nationalist movements.

Empires of Intelligence presents a wealth of information that will interest students of French and British imperialism in North Africa and the Middle East. The author’s willingness to go beyond traditional imperial boundaries to forge a comparative study, though not always entirely successful, is a groundbreaking approach that deserves credit and commendation.