Normalization of U.S.-China Relations: An International History (review)

This well-written, well-edited volume delivers precisely what it promises: an international history. The authors of the eight essays include one from the United States, one from Great Britain, four from mainland China, one from Taiwan, and one from Russia. Together they provide a valuable range of perspectives on one of the major turning points in the Cold War. The book should prove exceptionally useful to students, although it contains little that will be new to scholars in the field.

One problem facing several of the authors is the necessity of relying solely on American sources. Those who focus on the Soviet Union, China, and Taiwan do draw on declassified materials and memoirs from these countries, but access to such documents has been highly restricted. We are still far from having a comprehensive understanding of what was going on in Beijing, Taipei, and Moscow during the critical years from the inauguration of the Nixon administration in 1969 through the Carter administration's recognition of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1979. On the other hand, thanks to the documents that were uncovered by the authors, we are a step closer. Moreover, we dare not be sanguine about access to American sources in light of recent revelations that the U.S. government has been reclassifying documents long in the public domain. The next generation may have to rely even more heavily on Henry Kissinger's self-serving memoirs.

The Taiwan issue looms large in the book. The Chinese negotiators, most obviously Zhou Enlai, pressed the Americans hard to accept Beijing's "one China" demand. Robert Accinelli analyzes the policies of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger with a clear and cold eye, recognizes that they yielded much to Beijing and hid their concessions, but contends that they had no choice. Rosemary Foot, in perhaps the most interesting essay in the collection, argues to the contrary that the Americans gave up too much, too quickly—far more than was necessary. Her argument is validated by Nancy Bernkopf Tucker's article, "Taiwan Expendable? Nixon and Kissinger go to China," in the June 2005 issue of the Journal of American History (full disclosure: Tucker is my wife). Joanne Chang provides the sad view from Taipei, where the government saw itself being betrayed by its protector.

The essay by Li Jie focuses on China's domestic politics and offers new details to substantiate a familiar story. As Mao Zedong drifted into senility, the Chinese Communist Party was wracked by a struggle between radicals led by the Gang of Four and "pragmatists" personified by Zhou and Deng Xiaoping. All the contenders tried to gain access to Mao and to win his support. Mao issued Delphic pronouncements that were often subject to more than one interpretation—and contradicted himself frequently. Without openly saying so, Li leaves no doubt that he is describing a bizarre political system in which those who craved power manipulated the presumably infallible leader as best they could. The attempt to normalize Chinese-American relations was caught up in these machinations. It is hardly surprising that after describing this turmoil, Li stresses the need to maintain political stability in China or risk endangering the relationship between Beijing and Washington. Presumably that means Americans should stop calling for political pluralism and freedom in China.

On the other hand, Gong Li's essay focusing on the actual negotiations that led to the Shanghai Communiqué is old-fashioned diplomatic history involving the exchange of notes and conversations between leaders and their representatives. The most striking feature of Gong's work is the absence of any indication of the Chinese domestic factionalism of which Li Jie writes—and which posed such an enormous complication for the negotiators. Gong portrays Mao Zedong in top form: no diminution of his mental acuity is apparent. The article is reminiscent of the line we used to hear from Chinese participants in conferences back in the...