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Journal of Cold War Studies 3.1 (2001) 126-128



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Book Review

Kennedy, Macmillan and Nuclear Weapons


Donette Murray, Kennedy, Macmillan and Nuclear Weapons. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000. 220 pp. $65.00.

The Skybolt crisis and its aftermath in many ways epitomized both the discord and the collaboration that have characterized the relationship between Great Britain and the United States since the Second World War. With the exception of Suez, Donette Murray argues in Kennedy, Macmillan and Nuclear Weapons, "Anglo-American relations were never so starkly and publicly in disarray" (p. 31) as during the period in late 1962 when Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara announced the cancellation of the experimental Skybolt air-launched ballistic missile, which had been slated to become the centerpiece of Britain's independent nuclear deterrent. In turn, the Nassau agreement that followed the crisis proved to be a milestone in the subsequent development of the "special relationship" between the two countries.

The story of the Skybolt crisis and its impact on Anglo-American relations has been told many times, but, as Murray indicates, one of the stimulating things about historical research is that new evidence constantly emerges and provides the basis for a fresh analysis of past events. In this account of the Skybolt crisis, the new evidence is not quite as "startling" (pp. 79, 68) as Murray claims at times, but she does fill some important gaps in our knowledge and offers an interesting interpretation of the roles of a number of key players in the crisis.

The narrative begins with the Camp David meeting in March 1960 when President Dwight Eisenhower agreed to sell Skybolt missiles to Britain to replace the Blue Streak missile that the government of Harold Macmillan was about to cancel. As an unofficial quid pro quo, Britain agreed to provide facilities at Holy Loch for U.S. Polaris missiles. Problems were later to arise, however, over what Macmillan believed was a firm, though only oral, commitment by Eisenhower to provide Britain with Polaris when the time was right. Disputes also ensued over another element in the agreement that linked Polaris with a NATO multinational nuclear force. Both issues contributed significantly to misperceptions and misunderstandings during the subsequent crisis. From the Camp David meeting until the public cancellation of Skybolt on 11 December 1960, there were frequent indications that the missile was in trouble. One of the key questions raised by the crisis is why the British government did not realize until very late in the day that Skybolt was likely to be cancelled. Murray shows that there [End Page 126] was considerable wishful thinking in London and that the signals emanating from Washington were frequently confusing and ambiguous. She argues:

The continuing internal debate among the various departments within the administration prevented a rational, coherent and effective policy from emerging until it was too late. Poor communication, vested interests and hidden or ill-concealed agendas created a fluid situation, with Kennedy's staff divided over how to deal with the issue and the wider problems associated with it. (p. 74)

According to Murray, McNamara, in particular, must take much of the blame for the poor handling of the situation on the American side. Despite this, the British were very late in recognizing the seriousness of the problem, and they had no back-up plans in case the United States decided not to go ahead with the project. Not until a couple of days before the Nassau conference did the British position finally "come together" (p. 79).

Murray supports the conclusion of other studies that even before the Nassau meeting Kennedy and his key advisers had decided that they would provide Britain with Polaris should this prove necessary. The problem the president faced was that important officials in the State Department were determined to end the bilateral nuclear relationship and replace it with a multinational force that would help curb nuclear proliferation and encourage greater European unification. This sentiment colored the president's stance during the early stages of the negotiations, but when it became clear to Kennedy that his opening offer...

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