China Engages Asia? Caveat Lector

To the Editors:

In his recent article in International Security, David Shambaugh provides a far-ranging and thought-provoking account of China's engagement policy with the wider Asian region,¹ which he argues is "a principal catalyst in shaping a new order in Asia."² Shambaugh posits that "the traditional underpinnings of international relations in Asia are undergoing profound change, and the rise of China is a principal cause" (p. 64). Other causes of change that he points to include the relative decline of U.S. influence in the region; the growing role of norms espoused by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and attendant growth of ASEAN-linked institutions; increased technological and economic interdependence in the region; and improvements in China's relations with key regional states including India, South Korea, and Vietnam. As a result, Shambaugh asserts that in contrast to the situation just a few years ago, "the majority of Asian states currently view China as more benign than malign and are accommodating themselves to its rise" (p. 67). Following other observers, Shambaugh sees regional bandwagoning dynamics operating in China's favor.³

We contend, however, that there are serious problems in Shambaugh's thesis, which collectively leave us with much less room for optimism about China's Asia policy both in the present, as well as for the future. Three key points of critique merit further elaboration. First, Shambaugh devotes inadequate attention in his article to China's relations with two states, Japan and Taiwan, whose interactions in the last decade patently contradict his portrayal of skillful Chinese diplomacy.⁴ Second, his claim that "most nations in the region now see China as a good neighbor, a constructive partner, a careful listener, and a nonthreatening regional power" merely illustrates short-term trends in the post–Cold War era, mostly since 1997 (p. 64). A strong case can be made that many Southeast Asian states are economic competitors with China, and that some are hedging against its rise by consolidating their long-standing relations with the United States. Third, even if one were to look past the first two points of criticism, Shambaugh provides no convincing reason for why China should not simply be viewed as acting strategically, and behaving itself while it is on its ascent, so as to not induce balancing by regional states.⁵ In this view, once China feels that it has sufficient economic and military power, it will behave as other great powers have done in the past and insist that its preferences are respected, by force if necessary.

Critical Oversight: China's Relations with Japan and Taiwan

While Shambaugh is correct to point out the improvement in China's relations with a number of Asian states—notably some of the ASEAN states, along with South Korea and India—a sustained discussion of China's relations with two key states in the region—Japan and Taiwan—is conspicuously absent. This is a significant oversight because China's relations with these states are (1) arguably enormously important to regional stability; (2) have historically been prone to conflict; and (3) have been on a downward trajectory since the mid-1990s. At a minimum, Beijing's relations with Tokyo and Taipei call into question Shambaugh's conclusion that Chinese diplomacy is as astute as he claims (p. 64). Space constraints require that we paint only the general trends in China's relations with these two states.

As Thomas Christensen has argued, China exhibits a visceral and historically rooted distrust toward Japan and is resistant to the idea that any Chinese actions could pose a threat to it.⁶ This is an important issue because Chinese insensitivity to Japanese fears of a rising China is already fueling mutual suspicions that could easily activate security dilemma dynamics in Asia.⁷ Since the downturn in its economy in the 1990s, which has coincided with sustained Chinese...