Debating the Unipolar Moment

Debating the Unipolar Moment To the Editors: Michael Mastanduno In his article, “Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War,” Michael Mastanduno explores the ramificationsof realist theory in an effort to refute critics who challenge the enduring relevance of the realist paradigm.’ Specifically, he seeks to assess whether realism can serve as a useful guide to U.S. foreign policy after the Cold War. His prose is lucid and his methodology is impressive, as he adroitly draws out the observable implications of balance-of-power and balance-of-threat theory for post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy. Based on his examination of U.S. foreign policy since 1989, Mastanduno concludes that realism can indeed provide useful insights, with balance-of-threattheory offering the most plausible explanationof U.S. securitypolicy and balance-of-powertheoryproviding the most credibleexplanation for U.S. economicpolicy. Balance-of-threattheory is said to explain ”an effort to preserve America’s position at the top of the international hierarchy by engaging and reassuring other major powers,” and balance-of-powertheory is said to account for “an effortto mobilizefor national economiccompetitionagainstother major powers” (p. 51). But do we really need two different theories to explain U.S. foreign policy?Mastanduno claimsthat the United Statesis trying to play “economichardball” and “security softball” at the same time (p. 52), and that this presents a contradiction that can be resolved only by recourse to two separate theories. Granted, the issue areas are different, but neither balance-of-threat nor balance-of-power theory limits its domain to a single issue area. Surely the best way to resolve this seeming contradiction is to find one theory that explains both issue areas. Fortunately, such a theory is available. Although Mastanduno has invited its two sister theories to the ball, he has overlooked a third, more deserving member of the realist research family.This stepsisterof balance-of-powerand balance-of-threattheory, neglected and often belittled by its realist relations, is hegemonic stability theory. It is to this theory that the glass slipper properly belongs, because both U.S. security and economicstrategiesfit the expectationsof hegemonicstabilitytheory more comfortably than they do other realist theories. Hegemonic stability theorists argue that international politicsis characterized by a successionof hegemoniesin which a singlepowerful state dominates the system as a result of its victory in the last hegemonic war.2The Mark S. Sheetz is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at Columbia university. The author wishes to thank Robert Jervis and Timothy Crawford for their helpful comments. Michael Mastanduno is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. 1. Michael Mastanduno, “Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US. Grand Strategy after the Cold War,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 49-88. Subsequent citations to this article are in parenthesesin the text. 2. For the application of hegemonic stability theory to international security affairs, see Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York Cambridge University Press, 1981). For its applicationto internationaleconomicrelations,see Charles P. Kindleberger,The World in Depression, 2929-2939 (Berkeley:University of California Press, 1973);Stephen D. Krasner, ”StatePower and the Structure of International Trade,” World Politics, Vol. 28, No. 3 (April 1976), pp. 317-347; and International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter 1997/98), pp. 16M74 0 1997 by the President and Fellows of Hanrard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 168 Correspondence I 169 hegemon establishes an international order that promotes its own particular interests and values, and supplies public goods such as international security and an international economic order? The hegemon provides stability in international security affairs by acting as balancer of last resort, and promotes stability in international monetary and trade regimes by acting as lender and market of last resort. But, in an effort to maintain its dominant position, the hegemon inevitably overpaysfor public goods; and differential rates of economic growth, combined with the diffusion of military and economic technologies, ensure that challengers will arise. A declining hegemon will then attempt to defray the costs of dominion by exacting tribute from clients, by reducing its share of the cost of public goods, by changing the rules...