Organizing for National Security

National Security 1o n e of the most critical decisions a new president must make during the two months prior to his inauguration is the manning and structuring of the National Security Council staff and the network of other security agencies. In that regard, the newlyelected President confronts a variety of questions: -Who will be the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs? -What will his role and priorities be? -What qualificationswill be sought for membership on the NSC staff? -How large will the staff be? -How will the NSC system be structured? These issues have become especially significant in light of the prominent role the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs and his staff have played in recent administrations. The reasons go beyond the personal prominence of Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski. There are at least three other influences that have made the NSC staff central to making and executing national security policy: -The increasing frequency of the President’s direct involvement in foreign policy, as in summit talks such as the Camp David negotiations. -The emergence of a new class of security issues that cut across traditional boundaries to include for instance, energy and economic policy. The more comprehensive character of national security today represents a marked change from the range of issues facing the NSC in the 1950sand 1960s. -The growing interdependence and complexity of traditional security problems . Pure foreign policy or even foreign policyldefense problems rarely exist. In most cases domestic politics are involved. For these reasons the next administration should focus early on the structure and functions of the NSC system, whether or not the incumbent is elected. The short period between election and inauguration requires critical organizational and staffing decisions. Advance thinking will pay off handsomely . Each president since World War I1 has brought a different approach to the management of national security affairs. The NSC has normally served as the top-level decision forum, while the Assistant to the President for National Philip A. Odeen is Partner-in-Charge, Managwent Consulting Services of Coopers and Lybrand, Washington , D.C., where he bas prepared the report, NationalSecurityPolicy Integrationunder the auspices of the President‘s Reorganization Project. Mr.Odeen was a staf member of the National Security Council, as wll as an oficial of the Department of Defense. International Security I 112 SecurityAffairs and his staff served as coordinators of the process as well as personal advisors to the President. The way the institutions of the NSC system have been used has varied widely, however, reflecting each president ’s personal management style, his executive experience, the personality of the National Security Assistant and, to a lesser extent, security problems inherited at the moment of taking office. Most presidents have favored, at least nominally, cabinet government when they initially structured their administrations. Background briefings and press releases usually have spoken of the new, important, and independent roles given to the ”outstanding individuals” selected to head the major departments. The presidents have recognized, however, that there are some substantive areas as well as certain crisis situations in which control, or at least detailed involvement by their staff is essential. A clear example of such an area is arms control. A White House-directed interagency SALT process is necessary because the issues often affect several departments. Theseissuesare highly contentious,and they are of such political importance that the President and his key advisors are inevitably involved. There is no ideal system for managing national security policy. Each president will tailor a system to reflect his unique needs and style. In some cases he may desire a very structured system;in others a highly informal approach. Nonetheless, a degree of planned structure is essential in any president’s national security system, regardless of his philosophy. Experience suggests that every administration must consider the following: -Some issues demand presidential decisions. Issues such as MX basing and SALT policy critically affect the President and his administration and, therefore , are simply too important for cabinet officers alone to decide. -Presidential decision issues are inevitably complex. Both the organizational structure and the deliberative processes must ensure that a full range of options is developed and that the President addresses them early enough...