Remembering the Cuban Missile Crisis: Should We Swallow Oral History?

Correspondence Remembering the Cuban Missile Crisis: Should We Swallow Oral History? T othe Editors: Murk Kramer Bruce J. Allyn, James G. Blight, and David A. Welch Bruce Allyn, James Blight, and David Welch should be congratulated for a splendid review of some of the most important findings from their joint research on the Cuban missile crisis, including the conferences they helped organize in Hawks Cay, Cambridge , and MOSCOW.’ They have performed an invaluable service for both historians and political scientists. Nevertheless, the research methodology that Allyn, Blight, and Welch (henceforth AB&W)have used is not without its drawbacks. Although their work has given us a much better understanding of the American side of the Cuban missile crisis, I am not sure we yet have a better understanding of the Soviet side. Indeed, our “knowledge” of certain aspects of the Soviet role may, if anything, be more confused than before. The reservations I express below, though applied to the AB&W article, are intended as general notes of caution. Mark Kramer teaches international relations at Brown Uniziersity and is a research fellow at the Center for Foreign Policy Development at Brown. He is also a fellow of Harvard University’s Russian Research Center. Bruce Allyn is Associate Director of the john F. Kennedy School-Soviet Joint Study, Center for Science and International Affairs (CSIA), Harvard University. Iames G. Blight, formerly with CSZA, is Senior Research Fellow, Center for Foreign Policy Development, Brown University. David A. Welch has been a CSZA Research Fellow; in fall 1990 he joins the faculty of political science at the University of Toronto. 1. “Essence of Revision: Moscow, Havana, and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” International Security, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Winter 1989190), pp. 136-172. (Subsequent references appear in parentheses in the text.) This article stands well on its own, but is best read in conjunction with two earlier products of the Cuban missile crisis project: James G. Blight, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and David A. Welch, “The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited,” Foreign Aflairs, Vol. 66, No. 1(Fall 1987), pp. 170188 ; and James G. Blight and David A. Welch, On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York Hill and Wang, 1989).On the Brink contains, among other things, abridged transcripts of the Hawk’s Cay and Cambridge conferences, with detailed annotation by the authors. The unabridged transcripts of the two conferences (which are reconstructed from notes, since the meetings were not tape-recorded) are available as Working Papers from Harvard’s Center for Science and International Affairs (CSIA). The transcript of the Moscow Conference (which was taped) will be available later this year from University Press of America as CSIA Occasional Paper No. 9. fnternationul Security, Summer 1990 (Vol. 15, No. 1) 0 1990by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and o f the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 212 Correspondence I 213 Limits of Oral Histoy The AB&W article relies heavily on “oral history,” that is, the recollections of officials in the United States, the Soviet Union, and Cuba who either participated in the Cuban missile crisis or knew the participants. The authors briefly allude to the “weaknesses” and “inherent limitations” of oral history; but these problems do not deter AB&Wfrom concluding that recent contributions of Soviet officials“have greatly improved the understanding of the causes, conduct, and implications of the Cuban missile crisis (pp. 171, 172).” Can the limits of oral history really be overcome so easily? In the case of the Cuban missile crisis, the failings and selectivity of memory are especially acute because the events transpired nearly 30 years ago and almost all of those who played any part in the crisis (andare stillalive) are now elderly. There are bound to be honest divergences in the way aging men recall events of nearly three decades ago. Along with inevitable failings of memory, there is the more nettlesome issue of ulterior motives. AB&W point out that ”current interests and objectives color recollections of historical events.” Thus, many officials will ”recall” events (p. 171) in a way that puts the best gloss on their own role or that supports causes they have come to promote. On the American side, this is perhaps best evident with...