Editors' Note

Editors’Note merston is reputed to have said, has “no permanent Agreat power, Lord Palfriends ,” only “permanent interests.” Much of the contemporary debate on U.S. grand strategy is a series of arguments over whether he was right. The relative importance of Western Europe, the Third World, and the Pacific region have been key questions. This issue of International Security features four essays that present different perspectives on where U.S. interests lie and the proper means to defend them. In ”The Case for Finite Containment: Analyzing U.S. Grand Strategy,“ Stephen Walt of the University of Chicago argues that four critical issues must be addressed in formulating grand strategy: identifying key areas of vital interest; the balance of offense and defense; Soviet intentions;and the causes of alignment. He concludes that the most appropriategrand strategy for the United States isfinite containment:similar to the strategies outlined by Walter Lippmann and George Kennan in the 1940s, it would emphasize containing Soviet expansion on the Eurasian landmass. The United States would preserve its present alliances with Western Europe, Japan, and Korea, and protect Western access to Persian Gulf oil. It would not, however, developforces for large-scale interventions in the Third World or mount a global crusade against Marxism. Steven David of The Iohns Hopkins University contends, however, that the Third World is central to U.S. interests, and makes the casefor continuing U.S. involvement there. In “Why the Third World Matters,“ David recognizes that defending Western Europe and Japan is a key U.S. strategic objective, but he argues that the probability of combat and the potential threats to U.S. interests are also great-perhaps greaterin the Third World. Many Third World regimes are unstable and most post-1945 conflicts have taken place in the Third World. U.S. economic stakes in the Third World are not limited to the Persian Gulf; strategic minerals arefound in many other regions and U.S. economic ties with the Third World continue to grow. American public concerns about terrarism and nuclear proliferation requirean active U.S. policy toward the Third World. The United States, David concludes, should avoid protracted Vietnam-likewars, but must maintain the capability to launch a major intervention that can accomplish its goals quickly. In “The Keys that Lock Up the World: Identifying American Interests in the Periphery,” Michael Desch of Harvard‘s Center for International Affairs argues that many regions that lack intrinsic importance because they have no key resources or are economically underdeveloped are nonetheless important to the defense of vital areas, and therefore have extrinsic importance to the United States. Desch surveys cases of Jnternntional Security, Summer 1989 (Vol. 14, No. 1) 0 1989by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 3 lnternational Security 14:l I 4 great power grand strategy from the Peloponnesian War to the British Empire and finds that states that failed to recognize this crucial interdependence of intrinsically and extrinsically important areas tended to commit strategic blunders that led to their downfall. Former National Security Council and State Department official Robert Johnson, in "The Persian Gulf in U.S. Strategy: A Skeptical View," questions the U.S. need to maintain ground forces for possible use in the Persian Gulf. Johnson argues that current market conditions and the availability of alternative sources make it unlikely that the oil crises of 1973-74 and 1979-80 could be repeated. He concludes that a Soviet ground assault on Iran or other Gulf states is highly improbable. The United States should instead plan for contingencies involving local powers in the region, which generally can be met by air and sea forces. Large-scale operations, for example to seize oil fields, would be difficult to sustain and would probably defeat their objective by inviting preemptive sabotage of oil installations. Although the United States must prepare for limited uses of force, as in the Iran-lraq war, a large Rapid Deployment Force for major ground conflicts is not necessary. This issue alsofeatures three book review essays:Donald MacKenzie on Innovation and the Arms Race by Matthew Evangelista, Michael Howard on McGeorge Bundy 's Danger and Survival and John Newhouse...