Contempt and Crisis in Poland

Contempt and Crisis i n Poland David A. Andelman F r o m the earliest days of the communist take-over at the end of World War 11, Poland has formed a central link in the cordon sanitaire between the Soviet heartland and the NATO forces positioned across western and central Europe. From geographic , political, ideological, even cultural and social viewpoints, Polanda nation tied for centuries to the Russian, as well as the Soviet, empire-is central to Soviet control of Eastern Europe. It is a relationship based on a mutual respect and mutual fear, as well as on countless ties of language, culture, and society. Centuries of inbreeding of families across international boundaries and decades of inbreeding of politics between Warsaw and Moscow have further strengthened that bond. From a purely military perspective, as the only member of the Warsaw Pact retaining no boundaries on a non-Warsaw Pact nation, Poland has never been a front-line state. Only two Soviet divisionsare stationed on its territory, and the Polish armed forces are more poorly equipped than some Middle Eastern non-Warsaw Pact clients of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Poland plays a critical role. Its road, railways, and communications facilities are the principal conduit for the resupply of Soviet front-line divisions in East Germany . Soviet assistance and Polish manpower have built the most extensive road and rail network in Eastern Europe. The integrity of these facilities, their assured reliability, and uninterrupted functioning in the event of war, are central to Soviet strategic and tactical planning. Since the communist takeover in Poland in 1948, the nation’s reliability as an ally has been questioned only at rare intervals. But since the outbreak of labor unrest in the country a year ago, Poland’s position in Soviet military strategy is being reexamined. Past experiencewould suggest that in response to such threatening upheavals, the Soviets would resolve to undertake a military invasion. Given Poland’s unique strategic importance however, and a historical relationship with the Soviet Union whose components are in delicate balance, such a solution may prove a less than attractive prospect for the Soviet leadership. David A. Andelman is a CBS News correspondent based in Paris. He previously served as East European correspondent for The New York Times, and writes frequently on foreign and national security affairs. 1. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 2980-2981, IISS, (London: 1980),pp. 16-17. ZnternationalSecurity, Winter 1981/82(Vol. 6, No. 3) 0162-2889/82/03OG90-14$02.50/0 @ 1982 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the MassachusettsInstitute of Technology. 90 Contempt and Crisis in Poland I 91 The decision whether or not to intervene in Poland may depend most critically on Soviet perceptions of how the transit networks will be maintained . The Soviets must evaluate both the military vulnerability and the political reliability of these networks and of the population that maintains and operatesthem. On the one hand, Soviet officials are primarily concerned that internalpoliticaldevelopmentsdo not interrupt them even momentarily. Since many of these networks are operated by civilians, extended general strikes could have a major impact on the functioning of rail lines, switching systems, and highway maintenance. On the other hand, the Soviet leadership must weigh the chaos and possible damage that might result from any intervention. Finally, the Soviets cannot ignore the impact of any such decision on the rest of Eastern Europe. It is thus critical now for the Soviet leadership to evaluate accurately the Polish leadership and the Polish people-to be sensitive to nuances of the Polish character, and to how Polish workers would react to Soviet demands and Sovietneeds. Yet national sensitivityis not a qualityin which the Soviets have excelled throughout their post-war history. The Russian leadershiphas regarded non-Russians across their East European Empire, and indeed throughout the non-Russian areas of the Soviet Union, as distinctly and uniformly inferior, treating these peoples with contempt and arrogance. Beneath the levels of top officials, who correctly perceive their career advancement as tied to that of their counterparts in Moscow, feelings of antipathy have been amply if not (until now) vocally reciprocated in Poland. For Soviet political and...