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Human Rights Quarterly 25.4 (2003) 1167-1173



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Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Action, and International Citizenship (Albrecht Schnabel & Ramesh Thakur eds., Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2000) 536 pp.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces began air strikes in Kosovo on 24 March 1999. The dual goals of the action were preventing further oppression of ethnic Albanians and providing Kosovo with some level of political autonomy. The use of force followed several years' worth of tough statements, threats of force, and failed negotiations culminating in Serbia's rejection of the international Contact Group's plan for the region during negotiations at Rambouillet, France. The combination of air strikes, fighting on the ground between Serbians forces and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), and an intensified crackdown by Serbians forces injured and killed thousands and led more than 800,000 people to become refugees, either within Kosovo or in surrounding countries. On 9 June 1999, the war ended when Serbian officials agreed to meet many international demands, withdraw Yugoslav troops from Kosovo, and accept the establishment of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to provide security and begin reconstruction in the region.

NATO's action had important implications beyond its immediate consequences for the situation in Kosovo. Yugoslavia was a sovereign country that was not presenting any immediate international security threat; NATO's action thus raised the issue of when human rights violations can overcome the norm and law of noninterference and justify international action. NATO troops acted without a UN Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force. As a result, the United Nations (UN) role in the international system and the legitimacy of regional alliances, or ad hoc coalitions of the willing, to act without the support of the full international community were questioned. NATO's decision to rely on air strikes rather than ground forces also led many to conclude that major powers remain so intolerant [End Page 1167] of casualties that humanitarian interventions will remain rare. Additionally, the chaos that developed during the air strikes highlighted the problem that international actions can worsen the conditions for the very citizens they are designed to protect. Finally, the efforts to reconstruct Kosovo raise important debates on the possibilities of nation-building and the merits of establishing international protectorates to assist security and development.

Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Action, and International Citizenship, edited by Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur, is a wide-ranging attempt to deal with many of these broader issues, as well as with some particular questions raised by previous scholarship on individual regions and interventions. The book is an important contribution to the literature, but scholars may choose to read selectively depending on their interests. Those interested in the politics of a specific region or country, or in narrower issues, such as the media's impact on military interventions, may want to begin by reviewing the facts presented in the opening history chapters and then jump to later chapters on their area of focus. Those more interested in the broader issues, and how the war may shape the international system, may want to review the history, then read chapters in parts five and seven—"Challenges of the Post-war Order" and "Force, Diplomacy, and the International Community"—and finally backtrack to selected chapters to see how various countries perceived the issues discussed in the later parts. Despite its length and breadth, the book does not provide great detail on events on the ground, such as how the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) dealt with the refugees and how the UN organized the reconstruction process; the major exception is the second half of A.J.R. Groom and Paul Taylor's chapter on the UN. Therefore, those looking for a "how-to" handbook on humanitarian intervention, refugee crises, or reconstruction are likely to be disappointed.

In their acknowledgments, the editors note a desire "to publish this book...

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