The Mufti of Jerusalem and the Nazis: The Berlin Years (review)

A spate of books, articles, and internet posts has lately sought to establish a link between Arabs and the Nazis with regard to the Holocaust. Although varying greatly in worth, most have as their major message (or at least as a transparent subtext) the proposition that "the Arabs" of today are the spiritual heirs of National Socialism's genocidal mission targeting the Jews. In my assessment, Klaus Gensicke's narrowly focused study on Amin al-Husaini (189?-1974), the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, belongs to this project.

Although not a biography, Gensicke's book is instructive about how al-Husaini used his famous family to become the Mufti of Jerusalem (1921)—that is, the chief Islamic authority on legal and religious matters—and how he used his office to achieve considerable influence in the Arab world over the following three decades. His ruthless pursuit of three related goals—to undermine the British mandate, to prevent the immigration of Jews to Palestine or the creation of a Jewish state there, and to win support for the cause of Arab unity and independence—provides the framework for the book. The Mufti's ambitions led him into conflict with the British authorities, who suspected him of repeatedly instigating Arab violence against Jewish settlers and also of terrorizing more moderate Arabs in the area. To escape arrest, al-Husaini fled the region and, when the opportunity presented itself, made his way to Berlin. He spent most of the war years there, pursuing his agenda under the auspices of the Axis powers. Gensicke shows convincingly that dogged advocacy and a personal style that (somehow) combined obsequiousness and arrogance resulted in only minor successes for the Mufti.

In winning Nazi support for Arab independence, the Mufti faced problems that, whether or not he ever fully understood them, proved insuperable. He was adept at playing party and state agencies off against one another but could not overcome Hitler's initial reluctance to alienate the British, who, Hitler still hoped, could be persuaded to accept German expansion in central and eastern Europe. Another obstacle stood in the way of al-Husaini's grand strategy, one that could not be overcome by the loathing of Jews he shared with the Nazis. When one of the characters in Disraeli's Tancred pronounces that "Arabs are but Jews on horseback," he probably meant it as a compliment. Hitler had no such positive views of the other Semites, the Arabs, whom he once described as "painted half-apes who want to feel the knout." He placed no faith in their ability to govern themselves or to render meaningful military assistance to the Third Reich.

Even after he despaired of an accommodation with the British, Hitler dared not offend Italy by interfering in its acknowledged sphere of Mediterranean interest. Similarly, he saw no reason to upset his Vichy allies by supporting Arab aspirations in North Africa. Although the Mufti eventually wrested from the Nazis a public opposition to the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine, he got no satisfaction when it came to guarantees for Arab independence following an Axis victory. Nor was he any more successful in gaining weapons or money from Germany to organize an Arab revolt against the British. (Gensicke here differs from the consensus view, claiming that the Nazis were always generous with funds to the Mufti.) The Mufti's essential problem was that he had too little to offer the Axis beyond performance of propaganda tasks among the world's Muslims. After the war turned against Germany, he helped recruit Bosnian Muslims for the Waffen-SS. When the war ended, he managed to escape the consequences of his collaboration as none of the victors found it in their interest to put him on trial. The Mufti was eventually sidelined by a new generation of Arab activists and government leaders. He had outlived his usefulness to them and the cause they espoused.

In most of the essentials of...