Moral Responsibility in the Holocaust: A Study in the Ethics of Character (review)

In this volume, Jones attempts to establish a strictly philosophical foundation for dealing with the problem of moral responsibility that arises out of an ethical analysis of the Holocaust. To those who ground their ethical reasoning and concrete moral responses in religious convictions as well as in philosophy, the argumentation may seem incomplete. But given the increasing heterogeneity of contemporary society, in which the language of one particular religion or secular ideology is insufficient to shape public moral discourse, Jones's effort to develop a basis for evaluating moral responsibility on a more neutral philosophical foundation is a welcome addition to the growing body of post-Holocaust ethics literature.

Jones begins with a brief overview of the book and its methodology. He has divided the volume into two major sections. The first section offers a capsule summary of what in the field is termed the "ethics of responsibility," sometimes also referred to as the "ethics of character" or "virtue ethics," although Jones focuses on the individual agent more than some approaches—particularly religious—that emphasize the moral ethos within the community. Jones often takes examples from the Holocaust era. The purpose of this first section is to propose a basis for evaluating the specific moral dilemmas, which are discussed in section two, that emerged from the Holocaust.

Within section one Jones addresses three major questions, the first of which concerns the actions of the Holocaust's perpetrators. Although most people would consider their actions gravely immoral, we must pursue the rational basis for such a judgment. Jones argues that the answer ultimately derives from a prima facie sense of duty not to harm others.

The second question revolves around the nature of good moral character. Here, in more philosophical language, Jones argues for the cultivation of virtues in order to promote permanent character development. However, he acknowledges the possibility of the development of a character of vice, as exhibited in leading Nazi figures.

In the discussion of the third question, particularly intriguing to this reviewer, Jones examines the challenge of excuses—when they are legitimate versus when they are merely smokescreens for the cultivation of vice. Considering historical situations, he asks whether bystanders had legitimate excuses not to engage in the rescue of the Nazis' victims. Jones distinguishes between the types of excuses that were offered. I know of no other work on ethics and the Holocaust that deals with this issue in as comprehensive and penetrating a fashion. Whether one agrees with his argumentation or not, Jones has nonetheless posed a vital question that future writers on the Holocaust and ethics cannot bypass.

Jones subsequently raises the issue of concrete determination of guilt. While most Germans likely knew something of what the Nazis were doing to the Jews, many denied knowing anything at all. Any determination of guilt requires credible evidence. Jones's warning, that we cannot assume the generic guilt of all bystanders, must be taken with due seriousness in any ethical assessment of the Holocaust. However, Jones places an excessive burden of proof on the ethicist. An ethicist can raise moral questions about the prevalence of moral inaction by the bystanders in Nazi Germany in a more generic way than would be admissible in a legal setting, for example.

In the second section of the book, one of Jones's central theses emerges: individuals who have been socialized into a corrupt political culture cannot be held responsible, at least not fully responsible, for their immoral conduct, either by way of commission or omission. Here Jones enters into a discussion of "social structural sin," debated at length by religious ethicists over the past several decades. While this issue remains contested, there is general agreement that a person bears responsibility to resist existing corrupt elements in a culture. For religious ethicists, and somewhat contrary to Jones, socialization into such a culture produces moral irresponsibility (in religious terms "sinfulness") in an...