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34Historically Speaking · September 2002 REGIONAL REPORTS New York City¡Wartin Burke. Lehman College. CUNY Joseph Skelly. College ofMount Saint Vincent On May 10, 2002, David Gordon, professorofhistoryat Bronx CommunityCollege (CUNY) delivered an address entided "France, 1940: The Uses ofDefeat" to a combined meeting ofthe NewYorkCitychapter of The Historical Societyand the NewYorkMilitary Affairs Symposium. In 1940 France was defeated and overrun bydie German armyin less than sixweeks. Of all die surprises ofthe Second World War, diis wasarguablydie moststartling. The defeatwas die resultofflawed French strategic and tactical planningand the inadequate trainingofseveral key divisions. However, one ofthe most remarkable results of die defeat was die decision of political leaders and commentators, both in France and die rest of the world, to ignore the technical aspects ofdie defeat in favor of much broader (and politically more useful) social, economic, and political explanations . Forsome, die rapid French collapse was proofofdie unwillingness ofthe militaryleadership and parts ofdie French political establishment to fight Hider. For odiers, defeatwas an indictmentofdie socialistexperiments that had been enacted by die Popular Front government of 1936. What is most striking about the post-armistice period was the universal desire to mydiologize die reasons fordie defeat radier dian analyze its purely military causes. The end of the Vichy regime and the defeatofNazi Germanyproduced new French myths, including diat ofwidespread French opposition to German and Vichy rule. The beliefdiat fascismwas a natural productofcapitalism , already strong before the war, was given new life bythe period ofVichycollaboration and would continue to inform French political discourse for decades. On May29, 2002,JosephMorrison Skelly, assistant professor ofhistory at die College of Mount Saint Vincent in New York City, delivered a paper entided "The End ofdie Affair: Ireland, dieEuropeanUnion, and die Rejection ofdie Nice Treaty" to a joint meeting ofthe NewYorkCitychapterofThe Historical Society and the American Irish Historical Society. Last year, the Irish electorate shocked die Irish and European establishments byrejecting the Nice Treaty (which expands die power of die EU over against diat ofmember states) by a solid margin of54% to 46%. This marks the end ofIreland's love affair widi die European Union. It also signals the end ofdie European political elite's fascination with Ireland, which had previously been considered a loyal member of the EU. The end of this affair came swiftly, abrupdy and, to many uninformed observers, without warning. Divorce papers have not been served, however, and diis relationship is unlikely to make its way to court for a final settlement: Ireland is not about to exit die EU. Still, a chill has settled upon die relationship, one which is quite unexpected in the context ofIreland's commitment to Europe over the past fortyyears. In die early 1960s Ireland eagerly sought entryinto die EUs predecessor, die European Economic Commission (EEC). Sean Lemass, dien die Irish prime minister, asserted diat Ireland "looked forward with a sense of deep responsibilityto makinga greatcontributionto the health and success ofdie European Economic Community." On an economic level, membership in die EEC wasviewed widi great promise: it was envisioned as a means offostering Irish enterprise, ofexpanding Irish markets , and of diluting the Irish economy's dependency on die United Kingdom. These economic aims have largely been achieved. In 1960, nearly 70% ofIrish exports were sent to Great Britain; today diis figure has dwindled to 22%. Even more impressive, in 2001 Irish exports totaled 92.5 billion euros, the highest ever recorded and an increase of 10% over the previous year. Ireland is the world's largest exporter ofcomputersoftware, a fact made possible, in part, by its access to the European market. The country has been die beneficiary ofbillions ofdollars in financial support from the EU, including farm subsidies , trade preferences; and infrastructure grants. In 1992, after an all-night negotiating sessionwidi EU officials, Albert Reynolds, Ireland 's prime minister atthe time, boasted diat more than 1.2 billionIrish pounds in EU funding "was in die bag." Indeed, diroughout die 1990s EU monetary assistance to Ireland accounted for more than 2 % of its annual GDP. Since it joined die EEC in 1973, Ireland 's standard of living has improved dramatically , increasingfrom less than 80% ofdie European average to being equal today, and it is soon set to surpass die European standard...

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