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  • Ein Institut und sein General: Wilhelm Faupel und das Ibero-Amerikanische Institut in der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus
  • Thomas E. Skidmore
Ein Institut und sein General: Wilhelm Faupel und das Ibero-Amerikanische Institut in der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus. Edited by Reinhard Liehr, Günther Maihold, and Günter Vollmer . Bibliotheca Ibero-Americana. Frankfurt: Vervuert, 2003. Photographs. Illustrations. Tables. Bibliographies. 615 pp. Paper.

Wilhelmine Germany (1871-1918) was noted for its creation of a network of excellent research institutes, including some for the study of overseas cultures and nations. This development resulted from several factors: the rapid rise and increasing sophistication of the German economy, the expansion of Germany's role in world trade, the creation of first-class universities, and Germany's well-established expertise in philology and foreign languages. The Ibero-Amerikanische Institut was founded in 1930 , near the end of the Weimar Republic. As a scientific area- studies institute, it enjoyed only a few years of independence before being subordinated to the Nazi Gleichschalting (restructuring) that transformed all institutions in the country. The authors of this book are determined to rescue the institute's good academic name by documenting (and denouncing) its misuse for geopolitical ends.

How was the institute exploited by the Nazi government? The agent to this end was army general Wilhelm Faupel, the institute's director from 1934 to 1945. Not surprisingly, Nazi bureaucrats were anxious to strengthen contacts with Germans living in Latin America in order to mobilize support for German government policies and to lobby for German interests. This was especially true in the mid-1930 s, when the Nazis profitably manipulated their extensive trade relations with Brazil. Since the institute's area also included Spain, Faupel used his position to strengthen relations with Franco's Spain after 1936. Meanwhile, institute intelligence operations centered on shipping and communication in the prewar and war periods. German territorial ambitions in South America, on the other hand, were never a serious goal, despite some early fantasies on Hitler's part.

Ironically enough, the evidence does not demonstrate that the institute made any significant contribution to the Nazi war effort. As the authors show, an obstinate historian is not to be underestimated in his or her ability to set the institutional record straight. Besides, we still have the institute's library (800 ,000 volumes)—one of the two or three finest Latin American and Iberian collections in the world. To paraphrase Josef Stalin, Hitlers come and go, but the books remain.

Thomas E. Skidmore
Brown University
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