Iran and the West: A Symposium

IRAN increase the prospects of peace between Israel and Syria and Lebanon. In order to succeed, this policy will require the United States to develop robust means of deterrence that carry the threat of unbearable consequences to Iran in the event it succeeds in developing a bomb and attempts to use it. Should Iran reject a U.S. offer made in good faith for improved relations, there would be far greater international support for tough action against the regime in Tehran. The rise of the Shia in the wake of the war in Iraq has coincided with increased violence in the Middle East. Although the war has resulted in unprecedented loss of U.S. credibility in the international arena, the outcome thus far suggests that Iran stands to lose from chaos in Iraq and further conflict in the Middle East. Both countries therefore have an incentive to seek a detente. A deal would help the United States to improve its standing in the world, and reassert its supremacy as a global power, and would allow Iran to assume the role of a power in the Persian Gulf committed to stability in the region. The price of confrontation may be too high for both countries, and the potential dividends of • deal too tempting to ignore. YITZHAK NAKASH is currently a Carnegie Corporation Scholar. He is the author of Reaching for Power: The Shia in the Modern Arab World. Suzanne Nossel T HE PROSPECT of a nuclear-armed Iran— bent on regional domination, aggressive toward Israel, and hostile to the United States—is as serious a threat as the United States has confronted in recent decades. For at least two key reasons, that threat will not be directly confronted with force in the short term. First, there are genuine questions about how close Iran is to nuclear weapons capabilities . Estimates differ and are inconclusive. After the intelligence failure in Iraq, standards of proof are high, and policymakers in Washington and in capitals abroad will demand more certainty before taking aggressive action. Second , U.S. military capabilities, regional influence , and diplomatic leverage are effectively reduced by the grinding conflict in Iraq, making the prospect of a second simultaneous conflagration in the Middle East both politically and militarily untenable. For now, containing the threat posed by Iran will center on diplomatic measures aimed at dissuading the Iranian regime from pursuing its nuclear ambitions, sustaining international unity in opposition to Tehran's weapons program, and preventing escalation of the conflict to a point where force is the sole remaining option. The policy will amount to a carefully calibrated, hands-on holding pattern designed to draw out the problem to a point where it can be solved diplomatically and politically or where circumstances have changed to make the use of force feasible. In this context, questions will arise about whether Washington is right to refuse direct talks with the regime of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Current U.S. policy is that as long as Tehran declines to suspend uranium enrichment, direct talks are off-limits . The reasons for spurning face-to-face negotiations are clear enough. Ahmadinejad is a sworn enemy of Israel and a Holocaust denier. He has thumbed his nose at serious offers by the United States, Europe, China, and Russia to strike a bargain for economic and political rewards in return for nuclear safeguards. In engaging directly with such a leader, the United States risks dignifying and publicizing his cause. Ahmadinejad seems bent on positioning Iran as a power with global stature, and going toe-to-toe with Washington could advance that aspiration. There's also little to suggest that direct talks between countries with competing worldviews and strategic objectives will bear fruit. After all, the United States and Iran do communicate regularly through foreign intermediaries and the media, such that each knows the other's bottom line. Talking to Tehran is neither a solution to the crisis in itself , nor is it particularly likely to lead to one. DISSENT / Winter 2007 n 49 IRAN Although talking to Tehran will not end the brewing nuclear standoff, it could advance Washington's goal of keeping a lid on it long enough for more appealing...