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Book Reviews327 The Thaksinization of Thailand. By Duncan McCargo and Ukrist Pathmanand. Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 2005. Softcover: 277pp. Never has a Thai leader generated so much academic interest in so short a time. Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra's rise to power in January 2001 and his prolonged rule since have been so phenomenal and unrivalled in Thai political annals that they have spawned a burgeoning sub-field in the study of Thai politics that can be dubbed "Thaksinology", underpinned by all kinds ofbooks and articles focusing on Thaksin and all facets of his personal and professional life. The volume under review is the latest English-language investigation of the telecommunications billionaire in the seat of power. It is a team effort between the most prolific Western analyst of Thai politics and an indigenous researcher who is fast coming into his own. Coming out within a year of Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker's incisive and insightful Thaksin: The Rusiness of Politics in Thailand, McCargo and Ukrist had a tough act to follow. Yet The Thaksinization ofThailand does not disappoint, notwithstanding a handful of empirical kinks and analytical shortcomings. For critics of Thaksin's virtual authoritarian rule and pandering populist policies, this book offers intellectual therapy and sheer indulgence. Unlike Pasuk and Baker, McCargo and Ukrist make no pretence of non-partisanship. They pull no punches from the outset, opening with a salvo in the first chapter that "... Thaksin is an opportunistic politician, for whom ideas are simply a means to an end. He is not animated by the pursuit of ideas, but by the pursuit of wealth and power. Thaksin's greatest achievement is the creation of a formidable political and economic power network, the mother of all phuak" (original italics), in reference to the Thai leader's nexus of factions (p. 20). In the last paragraph of the book, the authors depart with all guns blazing. The penultimate conclusion leaves little doubt: "Thaksin Shinawatra is not an ideas man. He is a brilliantly successful opportunist" (p. 252). In between, the crux of the book takes Thaksin to task on his conflict of interest in the télécoms sector, shrewd concoction of the ruling Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party, re-politicization ofthe military, manipulative political discourse, and personal networks that have reshaped Thailand's political economy. The book is primarily divided along the two authors' complementary areas of strength. McCargo traces Thaksin's rise in chapter 1, tackles the TRT party in chapter 3, and scrutinizes the prime minister's discourse in chapter 5. In turn, Ukrist's even- 328Book Reviews numbered chapters cover the politics of télécoms, the military, and new political economy networks. Of particular interest is McCargo's treatment of the TRT, which follows his earlier work on Thai political parties. To the author, the TRT is not a genuine political party in the lenses of democracy theorists. Its 10 million-odd members from the rural masses and its concrete policy platform are illusory. Thaksin's Bangkok-based "electoral professionals" exploit marketing techniques to win grassroots votes, and ultimately rely on rural patronage networks to rule. At issue in this chapter is the long-standing debate about parties and factions in Thai politics. McCargo maintains that rural-based factions still lord over the TRT. However, the author might have paid attention to trends. Over his four years in power, Thaksin has gradually created a new numbers game emphasizing a "maximum-winning" coalition strategy, absorbing smaller parties, monopolizing the party scene and bringing as many MPs as possible into the coalition government. Armed with a critical mass of support bases revolving around his sister's northern camp, the Bangkok wing, and his handpicked MPs on the party list, the overwhelming parliamentary majority insulates Thaksin against unruly factions. As long as he can withstand the threat of and actual factional defections, Thaksin can maintain overall control of the TRT's various factions. McCargo also could have paid more attention to the 1997 constitution and its stipulations that have shifted significant authority from the legislature (e.g. party factions) to the executive for the ostensible benefit of stability and effectiveness (e.g. MP candidates...

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