Track-II Diplomacy: Lessons from the Middle East (review)

Official negotiations, or Track-I diplomacy, which largely deals with states' conduct in international relations and foreign policymaking, tend to emphasize the use of bilateral and multilateral negotiations, summits, and mediations, rather than force, as a means for resolving conflict. Although official diplomacy has often been effective in managing conflicts, official negotiators are also aware that it may not always succeed. With the failure of the Middle East peace, for instance, Israelis and Palestinians alike have increasingly become skeptical about the use of official diplomacy between them. Prior to the escalation of their recent violence, however, the use of unofficial contacts, or the Track-II diplomacy, which were largely conducted in secrecy in the 1980s and the 1990s, succeeded in diminishing many earlier skepticisms, mistrusts, and broken promises that dominated their past relationship. Those involved in the Track-II diplomacy between Arabs and Israelis have included, among others, activists, politicians, academicians, and intellectuals who have tried to ease tensions between the warring parties.

Generally speaking, the book brings attention to the vital role that Track-II diplomacy can play in facilitating the groundwork for Track-I diplomacy to follow and possibly succeed. The book's core contributions are rooted in its conceptual and theoretical illustration of the importance of Track-II diplomacy, along with its case-oriented accounts that assess conducts in unofficial Arab-Israeli relations. Given the absence of official ties between Israelis and Palestinians in recent years, the focus is now more directed toward enhancing Track-II diplomacy in ways that may entice both sides to pressure their leaders to revive their official peace talks on more solid grounds. Unofficial diplomatic exchanges, which typically take place in more relaxed and less monitored atmospheres, are likely to allow for more mutual relations to rise between the parties, who may consequently become more willing to perceive the other in a humanized fashion and thus avoid obstacles that official diplomats often face. Also, the Track-II diplomacy, which includes ranks of intellectuals and academicians who may share similar values, prepares its partakers to become more able to rise above psychological barriers that may exist in official settings. Aside from their impressive academic contribution, the authors of this text have played a part in Track-II diplomacy. For instance, Hussein Agha and Ahmad Khalidi, who are senior members at St. Anthony's College, have served as advisors to the Palestinians at various peace talks. On the Israeli side, Shai Feldman, who heads the Jaffee Center for Strategic Affairs, authored various works on the region; and Ze'ev Schiff, who is the defense editor of the Israeli Ha'aretz newspaper, also wrote widely on Israel's military affairs. Together, they explored the subject of Track-II diplomacy in the region.

The book examines six core case studies of Track-II diplomacy, in addition to other less-known ones, held between Israel, Syria, and the Palestinians in the 1990s. They include the Oslo talks that began in the early 1990s, the "Project Charlie" talks between the Israeli settlers and the Palestinians in 1995–96, and the Israeli-Syrian talks of 1993. Among other things, these unofficial contacts explored regional security issues, claims and counterclaims of each party, and the potential for peacemaking and mutual understandings between them. Track-II diplomacy also included other follow-up exchanges, such as the Stockholm talks on final status issues in the mid-1990s along with the Taba talks that strove to rescue the peace process from its paralysis following the collapse of the Camp David II Summit in 2000. These contacts also aimed at easing tensions in the region and assisting in the renewal of official diplomatic ties between the parties. Although the breakdown in official diplomacy between the parties may have hindered peace efforts as a whole, the support for the use of Track-II diplomacy remains largely popular.

Before the Oslo Accords were announced, which were seen at the time as a watershed in Palestinian-Israeli...