To Antietam Creek: The Maryland Campaign of September 1862 by D. Scott Hartwig (review)

D. Scott Hartwig’s extensive research on the leadership, strategy, and political backdrop after the Battle of Second Manassas through the eve of September 16 provides a definitive perspective on the Maryland Campaign. En route to larger arguments, military historians often gloss over the weeks prior to Antietam with a vignette on the “return of McClellan,” or Special Order No. 191. However, as Hartwig intricately weaves through the order of battle, he uncovers the uncertainty that loomed in both armies as they made internal changes, added fresh units to their existing ranks, and navigated the valley terrain. His approach to the campaign is based heavily on the perspective of the high command, from the Official Records and personal memoirs, with the inclusion of common soldier accounts. Most significantly, Hartwig clearly articulates the relationships among the military operations and the impending midterm elections, the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, and the question of European support for the Confederacy. Thus, he convincingly argues that an in-depth campaign study on the events that culminated in the Battle of Antietam is long overdue.

To preface the campaign, Hartwig contends that the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia was superior in leadership, organization, and troop maneuverability, but lacked in supplies—whereas the Union’s Army of the Potomac was well equipped, but had poor morale and discipline. When the armies fought at Harpers Ferry, Turner’s Gap, Fox’s Gap, and Crampton’s Gap, both sides realized the difficulties of moving artillery, maintaining unit cohesion, and keeping communication between commanders. The leaders of both armies made mistakes: Confederate general Robert E. Lee never made entrenchments at Sharpsburg, and Union general George B. McClellan lost an opportunity to bring the Sixth Corps in on the early morning of September 17. Thus, Hartwig argues that the Maryland campaign legitimized the notion that even the best strategies rarely go as planned and most of the time commanders had to resort to their own intuition and speculation concerning the enemy’s intention. When the armies met at Antietam Creek, it was the result of the significant mid-September engagements during which decisions were made at the eleventh hour.

One of Hartwig’s greatest strengths is his ability to look at each commander outside the stereotypical view historians have assigned to them. He is careful to avoid the “what if ” scenario by remaining objective in his assessment of the leadership. For the Army of Northern Virginia, he clearly illustrates the difficulty General Lee faced in overextending his supply lines, maneuvering around the Blue Ridge Mountains, and crossing the Potomac River. From his analysis, one can argue that General Lee’s army successfully took the initiative and held interior lines and that Lee trusted his corps commanders with discretionary orders. For the Army of the Potomac, Hartwig asserts not only that the internal factioning among the leadership continued to haunt the command structure with confusion and delay but that a traditionally cautious General McClellan “behaved with uncharacteristic energy and took Lee by surprise” (344). In addition, he gives credit to traditionally overshadowed commanders, particularly Confederate general Lafayette McLaws, whose division captured Maryland Heights, and Union general Joseph J. Bartlett (then colonel), who secured Crampton’s Gap during the Battle at South Mountain.

Additionally, through his assessment of the Maryland home front, Hartwig revises the common perception of how civilians received the Army of Northern Virginia. He shows how, particularly in Frederick, they greatly affected the strategy of the Confederate high command and the conditions of the common soldiers. Not only did the majority of Marylanders demonstrate their loyalty to the Union, but the Confederate soldiers felt as if they “were not among friends” (117). While there were some southern sympathizers, Maryland civilians were reluctant to feed the Confederate army, which exacerbated the problems of fatigue, starvation, and straggling. During the Maryland campaign, as Hartwig illustrates, there existed symbiotic relationships among the home front, the political...