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  • The Knoxville Campaign: Burnside and Longstreet in East Tennessee by Earl J. Hess
  • Laura J. Ping
The Knoxville Campaign: Burnside and Longstreet in East Tennessee. Earl J. Hess. Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 2012. ISBN 978-1-57233-916-3, 424pp., cloth, $39.95.

During the fall of 1863, Union general Ambrose Burnside and Confederate general James Longstreet vied for control of East Tennessee and the railroad that linked southwestern Virginia with the Western Confederacy. The subsequent siege of Knoxville lasted from September to December 1863 and contributed to Gen. Ulysses S. Grant’s victory at Chattanooga. Historically, the 1863 Knoxville campaign has been overshadowed by the Federal victory at the Battle of Chattanooga, which allowed the Union army to infiltrate the Deep South. Author Earl J. Hess, however, argues that the Union’s political and humanitarian objectives for capturing Knoxville make the campaign more significant than previously recognized.

Militarily, East Tennessee, specifically Chattanooga, was important as the source of the east-west and north-south railroad line. Whichever army controlled the railroad would also control the most direct route from the western theater to Virginia. East Tennessee was also attractive to Union authorities because the population was predominately unionist. President Lincoln believed that Union control of East Tennessee was imperative to Union victory and the protection of this loyalist population. Until 1863, however, the Union army did not have enough additional manpower to support sending an army to the West. Only when General Burnside, who had been relieved from his post as commander of the Army of the Potomac, was appointed to the Ninth Corps and sent to Kentucky did the Union army have enough military force in the West to prioritize the capture of Chattanooga. Burnside and his army marched easily into Knoxville in the fall of 1863.

Confederate general James Longstreet also identified Chattanooga as an important stronghold because of its connection to the railroad. Longstreet believed that a Confederate victory was dependent on invading Union territory from Kentucky to the Ohio River. Tennessee provided the perfect gateway for implementing this strategy. Bolstered by the Confederate victory at Chickamauga in September 1863, Longstreet and two divisions of the Army of Northern Virginia marched toward Knoxville in hopes of recapturing the town.

The siege of Knoxville officially began on November 19. Although Hess notes that it was not a siege in the traditional sense, because Burnside’s food supply was too extensive for Longstreet to starve the Union army out of Knoxville, the experience was marked by extreme hardships for both civilians and soldiers. Affluent unionists fled before the siege was underway, but the majority of civilians faced the difficulties of life with twelve thousand soldiers. Fences were destroyed for firewood, tents and wagons were parked in yards and on sidewalks, and there was little regard for property. Civilians were forced to take shelter in cellars and ravines to escape falling shells. Supply shortages forced soldiers to eat corn originally intended for horses. [End Page 217] Winter weather and ragged uniforms resulted in Confederate soldiers fashioning shoes out of raw beef hides, while Union soldiers combated the cold by huddling in holes. Confederate efforts to retake Knoxville ultimately were abandoned after their defeat at Chattanooga in November 1863. Longstreet’s retreat clinched the Federal control of Knoxville, which ended Confederate efforts to conquer East Tennessee.

Hess’s attention to detail is commendable, but his insight into the military policy surrounding the Knoxville campaign lends little new information. The most valuable aspect of Hess’s discussion is in the description of the civil importance of liberating the loyalist population of Knoxville. Ecstatic loyalists, many of whom were African American, greeted Union soldiers. Tennessee had been excluded from President Lincoln’s 1863 Emancipation Proclamation, and as a result Burnside’s men were welcomed as emancipators. White citizens, too, believed that they were being freed from the control of a foreign power and willingly shared supplies and provided housing for Union officers. While the initial exuberance felt by unionist civilians waned during the siege, Federal support in Knoxville remained strong. According to Hess, the greatest legacy of the Knoxville campaign was the political benefits of freeing a loyalist...

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