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BOOK REVIEWS351 mand structure until Jackson's death at Chancellorsville in May 1863. In an especially judicious on-going comparison between Lee's two great subordinates , Hennessy finds much to praise and some to criticize in both Jackson and Longstreet. Perhaps his most enlightening comments reveal a departure from the standard images of the aggressive, hard-charging Jackson and the stubborn and slow Longstreet. Hennessy describes a Jackson who was slow to join in support of Longstreet's massive flanking attack on the last day of the battle and indeed "reverted to a mediocre form that by now was becoming standard for him" (459). On the other hand, Longstreet's concerns about his march to the battlefield and preparations for his massive flank attack were deliberate, well founded, and, most important, shared by Lee himself. Whatever the taciturn Old War Horse's flaws might be, Hennessy argues effectively that Douglas Southall Freeman had erred when he dismissed Longstreet's performance with the observation that "The seeds of much of the disaster at Gettysburg were sown" in the instant "when Lee yielded to Longstreet and Longstreet discovered that he would" (460). One of the most impressive aspects of this work, in addition to his thorough research effort, is Hennessy's obvious mastery of the fine details of terrain on this battlefield. This was a confusing battle fn many respects. The fighting was episodic and spread across ground compartmentalized by rolling ridges, woodlots, farmfields, and creeks. Such terrain permitted Hennessy to reduce the battle to a series of small-unit engagements, often down to the brigade and even regimental level, for an unparalleled view of the fight from the perspectives of the soldiers and officers locked fn a series of mini-battles at Brawner's Farm, along the railroad embankment, and on Chinn Ridge. Many of Hennessy's assessments stem from his understanding of the ground, and this only adds to the high quality of this work. For its insights, analysis, and fine attention to detail, Return to Bull Run will no doubt become the standard work on the Battle of Second Manassas. It deserves to be. Carol Reardon Penn State University Pea Ridge: Civil War Campaign in the West. By William L. Shea and Earl J. Hess (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992. Pp. xiii, 417. $29.95.) In the spring of 1862 the Union Army ofthe Southwest, commanded by Maj. Gen. Samuel R. Curtis, and the Confederate Army of the West, under the command of Maj. Gen. Earl Van Dorn, fought fn northwest Arkansas not only the largest and bloodiest Civil War battle west of the Mississippi River, but one of the war's most decisive as well. Under orders from Jefferson Davis to seize the offensive in the trans-Mississippi, Van Dorn attempted to weld together two previously antagonistic Rebel forces in the area—Ben 352CIVIL WAR HISTORY McCulloch's small Confederate army of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas troops and Sterling Price's Missouri State Guard—and "liberate" Missouri. In what promised to be a brilliant turning maneuver, Van Dorn flanked Curtis out of an almost impregnable defensive position along Little Sugar Creek and occupied a line solidly athwart the Union line of communications. Curtis responded , however, with a masterful change of front and boldly launched his outnumbered army into the advancing Confederates. For reasons still controversial after one hundred and thirty years, the battle of Pea Ridge became two simultaneous but distinct engagements. On March 7, McCulloch's division encountered the Union divisions of Peter J. Osterhaus and Jefferson C. Davis at Leetown, while Price's division engaged that of Eugene A. Carr at Elkhorn Tavern, two miles to the east. Both battles were Confederate disasters. The deaths of McCulloch and his senior subordinate, James McQueen Mcintosh; the capture of his next in command; and the failure of the next ranking officer to learn that command had devolved upon him resulted in the disintegration of McCulloch's wing. On March 8 the Federals at Elkhorn Tavern, reinforced by the remainder of Osterhaus's and Davis's divisions plus the fresh division of Alexander S. Asboth, drove Van Dorn and Price from the field and ultimately from...

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