In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

170CIVIL WAR history Mosby's command than had previously been known. He supports this conclusion with an extensive appendix, giving the name of every man he could find who rode with or was officially connected to the FortyThird Battalion. The author gives good sketches of Mosby's principal lieutenants. Also he cites several examples to show that Mosby refused to enlist Confederate deserters and that he maintained good discipline among his troops. In order to demonstrate Mosby's support among the people, Wert explains the network of civilian contacts and messengers that Mosby nurtured in his area of operations—primarily Virginia's Loudoun and Fauquier counties. So in the end it mattered little that Mosby and his rangers operated as guerrillas or that they disbanded rather than surrender. Mosby hurt himself among some contemporaries by subsequently supporting Ulysses S. Grant for president and taking a Republican patronage appointment. It is little wonder (although Wert seems puzzled) that Mosby did not attend many battalion reunions. The wonder may be that Mosby's name and reputation remained mostly free of the condemnation visited upon other Confederates who turned to the Republican party, such as James Longstreet. For those looking for a modern, well-researched, and spritely account of John S. Mosby, they will find it in Jeffrey Wert's book. Joseph G. Dawson III Texas A&M University The Papers of Andrew Johnson. Volume 8: May-August 1865. Edited by Paul H. Bergeron. (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1989. Pp. xlvi, 716. $45.00.) "You know," said the second President Johnson during his television memoirs from the banks of the Pedernales, "the hardest thing was not to do what was right, but to know what was right." And what about Andrew Johnson on the same point? He would hardly have admitted doubt in knowing what was right, and historians, emphasizing his racial views, condemn him for consciously refusing to do what was right during Reconstruction. The Andrew Johnson papers, a project underway for more than thirty years, has now gotten beyond Appomatox. The present volume reinforces and adds depth to the well-known story of Johnson's first presidential summer. And it provides additional evidence, if any should have been needed, to show the complexity of national problems Johnson faced and the inadequacy of simplistic explanations of his actions. Selectivity, much less a problem in the first volumes, will be a major constraint in the presidential years. The editorial staff has emphasized documents dealing with politics, amnesty and pardon, Johnson's relations BOOK REVIEWS171 with Tennesseeans, Cabinet members and other advisors, and personal exchanges with family and close friends. Even so, we still have a Johnson who wrote very little. Among approximately eight hundred documents selected from thousands, only seventy are by Johnson. Abraham Lincoln, in a similar elapse of time, produced not only much more writing, but more with significant content. Nor did Johnson make many public appearances, for there are only nine reports of speeches. The opinion, advice, and style conveyed to Johnson covered a wide spectrum. Senator James Dixon, a staunch supporter, enthused, "It seems to be a restoration of the 'Era of good feeling'" (31), whereas someone from New York, enraged at the imprisonment of Jeff Davis, began a two-sentence threat of bodily harm: "You fucked up Son of a Bitch!" (457). "Give my love to your lady and reserve a portion for yourself," wrote an old farmer who had known Johnson in the 183Os (38), but another was more blatant: "My kind regards to your son Bob and tell him not to let you forget to give me some good appointment and that too very soon" (173). Johnson received advice to get rid of Edwin M. Stanton; not to pardon any South Carolinians; to make a determined run for the nomination in 1868; to assure Southerners that their destiny would not be controlled by "strangers"; to put Hannibal Hamlin in the Cabinet not only because Lincoln admitted he had treated Hamlin badly but because Hamlin took responsibility for Johnson's inaugural intemperance; to prevent paroled rebels from returning home to Parkersburg, now in loyal West Virginia; to release Tennesseean Emerson Etheridge from military arrest so that European...

pdf

Share