A Matter of Allegiances; Maryland from 1850 to 1861 (review)

84CIVIL WAR HISTORY The author has told Breckinridge's story well. Perhaps he rates Breckinridge a bit too high as a military commander, but this is a matter of interpretation. Too, he overemphasizes Breckinridge as representing the "spirit of moderation and conciliation" in the 1860 presidential campaign . While the Kentuckian did attract many nonslaveholder voters, these were not necessarily moderate voters. A heavy majority (nearly three to one ) of the counties carried by Breckinridge supported secession in the winter and spring of 1860-61. One small error was detected; the author (p. 614) states "Greeley died during the campaign" of 1872, whereas he died within the month after the election. But this is an insignificant mistake and should not detract from the overall merits of the book. Breckinridge: Statesman, Soldier, Symbol is a magnificent work, truly deserving of the Jules F. Landry Award given by the publisher. Ralph A. Wooster Lamar University A Matter of Allegiances; Maryland from 1850 to 1861. By William J. Evitts. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974. Pp. xii, 212. $11.00.) Most Marylanders desperately wanted to avoid choosing between the North and the South, argues Professor William Evitts of Hollins College , because their state was "torn by internal divisions" and lacked a "clear sectional identity." The "old society" of the Tidewater was proSouthern while the commercial interests of Western Maryland and Baltimore tied the "new society" to the North. Fearful of the consequences of their divided loyalties, Marylanders acted as "conservative brokers" in national politics by supporting the Compromise of 1850, the Kansas-Nebraska Act, the Crittenden Compromise, and dismissing the agitation over slavery as "a politicians' sham, a conflict among 'ultraists,' 'fanatics,' and 'extremists' only." When a choice of allegiances finally had to be made in 1861, Evitts asserts, "Maryland had evolved into a pattern of life so different from that of the Southern states that secession was never more than a distant possibility." By the summer of 1861, "Maryland was Unionist in sentiment ," the author concludes almost apologetically, "though its choice was made manifest by its acquiescence to federal force rather than entirely by its own actions." Evitts attempts to explain Breckinridge's victory in Maryland, the Baltimore plot to assassinate Lincoln, and the April 19 riot as unrelated to Southern sympathies or temporary aberrations . His arguments are not convincing. Constitutional Unionist John Bell represented "the majority sentiment of Marylanders on national issues" in 1860, according to Professor Evitts, but he lost the election "because the association of his conservative party with defunct nativism cost him thousands of votes in Baiti- BOOK REVIEWS85 more." No direct evidence, however, is offered to support the contention that Baltimoreans were more concerned with the local issue of reform than they were with the sectional issues plaguing their fellow Marylanders . The fact is that most Marylanders perceived their choice as one "between 'Bell and the Union' or 'Breckinridge and Disunion!' ", and they chose Breckinridge. There are several oversights, inconsistencies, and contradictions in this book that should be noted. Although the author claims to have written "a rather precise kind of social history" that "looks much more at the populace than at the politicians," he fails to provide even the most rudimentary demographic information. This failure is compounded by relegating one of the most significant statistics in this study to a footnote. It indicates that Catholics voted against Bell, but no attempt is made to pursue the religious cleavages in the Maryland electorate. The assertion that "reform zeal" in Maryland contributed to the demise of the Whig party, the ascendency of the Know-Nothings, the decline of the Know-Nothings, and the defeat of Bell is crucial to Evitts' thesis. This reform impulse, he argues, grew out of an "aversion to politics " which had become "increasingly rougher and cruder" after "the elections of Andrew Jackson." This disillusionment with politics was not limited to "out-of-office" or "snobbish Whigs," he concludes, but was an universal phenomenon. The only evidence concerning aversion to politics as usual cited by Evitts is statements made by snobbish, out-ofoffice Whigs. Discussing the election of 1855 Evitts writes, "In the counties of Maryland the Know-Nothings ran best in the areas where...