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  • Stephen Girard’s Trade with China, 1787–1824: The Norms versus the Profits of Trade by Jonathan Goldstein
  • Dong Wang (bio)
Jonathan Goldstein. Stephen Girard’s Trade with China, 1787–1824: The Norms versus the Profits of Trade. Portland, ME: MerwinAsia, 2011. ix, 141 pp. Hardcover $65.00, isbn 978-0-9836599-7-6. Paperback $35.00, isbn 978-0-9836599-6-9.

Written by historian Jonathan Goldstein, this monograph examines the involvement from 1784 to 1824 of Stephen Girard (b. 1750–1831)—one of the first American millionaires and philanthropists—in the old China trade, the earliest direct contact between the United States and China, from 1787 to 1824.

The first American foray into the Asian Pacific in 1784 not only brought North America into the framework of international exchange in Asia, it also initiated the rapid rise of the United States as China’s second-largest trading partner by the turn of the nineteenth century. Traditionally, two interpretative strands—the dependency and modernization models—have shaped the broad contours of scholarly writing on the early America-China trade. The dependency school contends that the old China trade—the commercial component of a westward Pacific movement by the United States—was intrusive and imperialist, with the United States gaining capital for development at the expense of others. The modernization paradigm, on the other hand, suggests that American enterprise in China ultimately stimulated China’s long-term modernization efforts. Combining these perspectives, Goldstein’s work contributes to the growing body of recent scholarship that emphasizes the complex interactions among competition, profitability, the Chinese way of conducting commerce, foreign notions of free trade, and the changing business environment.

The book is divided into five chapters, grounded in comprehensive secondary and primary sources including the Girard papers, housed at Girard College in Philadelphia. Chapter 1 contextualizes the old China trade that fueled the new nation’s push for overseas trading markets as far away as East Asia. Following [End Page 71] independence, a severe economic depression and Anglo-American rivalry prodded Americans to push their way into world markets. Chapter 2 focuses on Canton and Philadelphia, the two cities at the epicenter of Chinese and American international trade. In chapter 3, Goldstein suggests that Girard’s entry into Philadelphia’s China trade was a result of the political, commerical, and industrial revolutions that reshaped Girard’s home country, France, and much of Western Europe and the Americas at the end of the eighteenth century. Favorable American tariff policies toward Chinese goods shipped by American entrepreneurs also helped Girard gain a foothold in the China trade.

Chapter 4 discusses how Girard and his designers overcame technological challenges and built a special class of ships for the China trade. Among the factors leading to the competitiveness of Girard’s ships in the China market were meticulous management, trading in opium contraband, exploitation of the three-legged (U.S.-Europe-China) trade route, the cultivation of working relationships with reputable Chinese hong merchants, and a sound understanding of the market forces of supply and demand. Chapter 5 connects the withdrawal of Girard from the China trade to the Terranova Incident in fall 1821. Francis Terranova, an Italian sailor on the Baltimore opium ship Emily, was strangled by the Chinese authorities without a proper trial on suspicion of causing the death of a Chinese woman. In addition to this case, the author identifies several other factors, such as the availability of advanced sail- and steam-powered vessels and the risks involved in dealing in an illegal drug, which also had a significant impact on Girard’s decision to quit his China business after thirty-four years.

What is less clear in Goldstein’s case study is the actual process whereby Girard decided to stop sending opium to China and eventually withdrew from the China market in the early 1820s. It appears to have been largely a practical business decision—based on a calculation of risks versus earnings—rather than the product of a clash between Chinese economic norms and “Girard’s intent to maximize profit,” as the author argues (pp. 85–87). A similar calculation was brought to bear, for example, when Canton was...

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