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  • China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy
  • Jonathan Harrington (bio)
Peter Hays Gries . China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy. Berkeley: University of California Press. 224 pp. Hardcover $24.95, ISBN 0-520-23297-6.

Many Americans were shocked at the level of outrage expressed by Chinese demonstrators in the days following the May 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. For most Westerners, the event was seen as a tragic mistake of war and little more. Many Chinese, however, viewed the bombing as another deliberate act in a long line of events dating back to the early nineteenth century aimed at humiliating China, both at home and abroad. What are the reasons for this radical difference in perceptions about the Belgrade tragedy, the EP-3 incident, and other recent "humiliating" events involving China's relations with the United States and Japan? Peter Gries, in his book China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy, offers an engaging analysis of the various factors that have shaped the Chinese understanding of these and other historical events. Gries specifically focuses on the rise of popular nationalism among China's "fourth generation" elites and how this growing movement could influence the future of Sino-U.S. and Sino-Japanese relations.

Conventional wisdom and writing about Chinese nationalism focus on the overriding importance of so called "top-down" explanations for the rise and maintenance of nationalism in the PRC. Most academics and other commentators assume that since China has an authoritarian political regime, Chinese nationalism exhibits few of the characteristics of the grassroots nationalist movements seen in more pluralistic societies. Another common characteristic of these writings is that they tend to downplay the effect that history and historical narratives have on [End Page 358] policy making. Third, these writings emphasize the explanatory value of "rational" policy-making models to understanding Chinese policies and actions.

Gries uses a distinctly different approach to understanding China's relations with the world. While he does acknowledge that traditional methods have their utility, he notes that top-down, ahistorical theories obscure the potential impact of emotions, history, and the evolution of growing grassroots nationalism on Chinese foreign policy.

Drawing from the social psychology literature, Gries discusses the widely used but often misunderstood concept of "face" and the impact it has on Chinese nationalism and foreign policy. Gries notes that the concept of face is not just "Oriental" but "applies to all humanity" and "captures the interplay of self and society in the process of constructing personhood" (p. 23). However, "face manifests itself differently in different contexts" (p. 24). For Americans, the Chinese concept of face is more accurately translated as "honor." In both societies, publicly humiliating or embarrassing others often causes them to "lose face." However, because Chinese society is more collectivist in nature, the social and psychological costs of publicly losing face may be higher than in a more individualistic society like the United States. Gries believes that this concept of face provides a compelling explanation for why Chinese demonstrators took to the streets after the Belgrade bombing. Demonstrators were motivated to act because they believed that United States' actions deliberately caused China to lose face and be publicly humiliated in the eyes of the world.

Historical perceptions and the use of history as a lens through which to view current events are also important to our understanding of popular nationalism in China. Sensitivity about face, combined with a predisposition to perceive current events in historical terms, has the potential to incite powerful emotional responses to actions taken by the United States and Japan deemed to be counter to Chinese interests. Gries notes that another reason why demonstrators expressed so much anger at the United States following the Chinese Embassy bombing is that most Chinese viewed it as just another incident in a long line of deliberate acts going back more than a century aimed at humiliating China.

Gries notes that another fact revealed by the Belgrade embassy bombing is that the nationalism-driven demonstrations that followed the event were not orchestrated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) but were driven by non-state actors, revealing the growing power and importance of popular...

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