Japan's Doctoring of the Yoshida Doctrine

[ 199 ] book review roundtable • japan rising & securing japan Japan’s Doctoring of the Yoshida Doctrine Christopher W. Hughes Commenting on these two excellent books written by two of the most internationally influential scholars working on Japan’s foreign and security policies is a daunting task. Boasting breadth and depth of coverage, these thought-provoking and timely analyses hold significant implications for a variety of questions related to the future of Japan, U.S. regional and global strategy, and indeed the future of East Asian regionalism. Kenneth Pyle’s and Richard Samuels’ substantial volumes converge a great deal in their objectives and approaches; both trace the path of Japan’s security policy historically and into the contemporary period. The two works do, however, diverge somewhat in their overall conclusions on Japan’s current and most likely future direction. Both Pyle and Samuels argue that Tokyo’s security policy in the modern era is best understood within the context of Japan’s determination to maintain national autonomy in an often disadvantageous international system. These two scholars both hold that since the Meiji period Japan’s elite policymakers have eventually settled on a series of policy consensuses in an attempt to navigate through international challenges. Although acknowledging that Japan previously made catastrophic mistakes in its security policy (most notably the Pacific War), Pyle and Samuels argue that on the whole Japanese elites maneuver extraordinarily well in generating policy options that have broadly preserved Japanese autonomy. In particular, these two experts offer superb analyses not only of Japan’s post-war policy consensus in the form of the “Yoshida Doctrine” but also of how, by staying close to the U.S. hegemon, Tokyo has managed to achieve many national goals that in former periods Japan had not been able to achieve. I see the key divergences between Pyle and Samuels, however, centering on the debate as to whether since the late 1980s Japan has made a transition away from the Yoshida Doctrine. Samuels argues persuasively that Japan, has not seriously considered abandoning the Yoshida Doctrine, despite public rhetoric implying that Japan might either acquiesce to U.S. domination or bid for outright autonomy. In fact, Samuels contends that as Japan since the late 1990s has strengthened ties with the United States, Tokyo has used the various military and diplomatic changes engendered by this shift to expand the range Christopher W. Hughes (PhD University of Sheffield, 1997) is Reader/Associate Professor, University of Warwick, UK. He is the author most recently of Japan’s Reemergence as a “Normal” Military Power (2004) and Japan’s Security Agenda: Military, Economic and Environmental Dimensions (2004). He can be reached at . [ 200 ] asia policy of hedging options. Japan has thus avoided the specter of entrapment by creating new avenues for hedging, thereby perpetuating the essence of the Yoshida Doctrine. He offers the scenario of a revamped Yoshida Doctrine, or new Goldilocks consensus,(p. 209) under which Tokyo is retaining close ties to the United States in order to exploit the benefits of hegemonic protection and yet is purposefully limiting the risk of hitching Japan irreversibly to U.S. military adventurism. Although less unequivocal than Samuels, Pyle intimates that Japan’s constant sensitivity to the changing international system, especially with regard to perceptions of declining U.S. hegemony and growing challenges from China, suggests that Tokyo may be poised to abandon the Yoshida Doctrine consensus. Whether the Yoshida Doctrine is dying and what might come next are questions on which Pyle and Samuels diverge in their analysis; this is where my own reading of the Japanese situation differs as well. I do not disagree with Pyle and Samuels’ understanding of the general trajectory of Japan’s security policy to date, the predilection of Japanese elite to maximize autonomy, and the great skill and ingenuity with which these leaders have sought to maintain hedging options. As I have argued elsewhere, however, I doubt the staying-power of Japanese elites’ determination to hedge and the skill with which they have played their hand in keeping their options open to both counter over-dependence on the U.S.-Japan alliance and the risks of entrapment. I agree with the final two chapters of...