Alternative Security and Foreign Policy Futures for China: 2020

David M. Lampton is Dean of Faculty and George and Sadie Hyman Professor of China Studies and the Director of the China Studies Program at the Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies. His forthcoming book, Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds (2007), examines Chinese power and draws implications for the world. He can be reached at . Note u This essay is a revised version of a paper that was presented at an NBR conference titled “China 2020: Future Scenarios,” Airlie Center, VA, February 15–17, 2007. Alternative Security and Foreign Policy Futures for China: 2020 David M. Lampton asia policy, number 4 (july 2007), 7–15 • http://asiapolicy.nbr.org • executive summary asia policy In the realm of security and foreign policy, China’s relationship with the international system may play out in various ways. This essay presents three main scenarios: cooperation, divergence, or a mixed trajectory that includes elements of both. Which scenario actually materializes in 2020 will largely depend on three key variables: China’s internal development (domestic stability), major power alignment (in particular, the Sino-Japanese-U.S. triangle), and the degree of integration and cooperation in economic and security affairs both within East Asia and the United States and Europe. Yet regardless of the path ultimately taken China will still on some levels be uncomfortable internationally, given the perceived imperative to keep domestic order at home irrespective of views abroad and given the huge spillover effects on the rest of the world of the PRC drive for high-speed economic growth. possible scenarios • Broadly cooperative u China increases its coercive capabilities as Beijing continues to place emphasis on economic and ideational power, but the regime generally cooperates with the international community on matters of global security and has sound and productive relations with the major powers including the U.S. and Japan. • At odds u Disagreement with the international community along a wide spectrum of issues leads China to place greater emphasis on the acquisition of coercive power. • Mixed u China’s level of comfort with the norms of the international system are mixed, leading to some cooperation on global security issues but presenting ongoing management and diplomacy problems vis-à-vis the other major stakeholders (especially the U.S. and Japan). [  ] lampton • alternative security and foreign policy futures for china In the realm of security and foreign policy, China’s relationship with the international system may play out in various ways. This essay presents three main scenarios: cooperation, divergence, or a mixed trajectory that includes elements of both. In the discussion that follows the presentation of broad scenarios, the principal determinants of which path Beijing’s relations with the world community will take are identified, as are the indicators to be monitored over the next decade plus. Three Futures In the realm of national security and foreign policy, three broad categories of future scenarios are possible. Scenario one: broadly cooperative u This is a future in which a broadly cooperative China sees its own interests as generally consistent with the requirements of maintaining the international system of the last sixty years. In this scenario China would continue to increase its coercive capability while placing approximately the same emphasis as today on economic and ideational power. China would have sound and productive relations with the United States, Japan, and the other neighboring major powers. China would act in a reasonably cooperative manner in pursuit of global security and other interests. Scenario two: at odds u In this scenario China’s own national interests and welfare are at odds with the prevailing international system across a broad range of issues, and Beijing places substantial emphasis on the acquisition of coercive power. In this future, China’s ties with the United States and Japan would be problematic, with considerable, friction-laden competition in third areas as well. Scenario three: mixed u This scenario is one in which China’s level of comfort with the current international system is mixed, with Beijing’s propensities sufficiently different from other major powers (particularly the United States and Japan) so as to represent a constant source of friction with Tokyo, Washington, and perhaps other major powers. At the...