Initiatives to Bridge the Gap

[  ] Initiatives to Bridge the Gap Kenneth Lieberthal Iwrite these comments from the perspective of a long-time academic who had the privilege of serving as Senior Director for Asia on the National Security Council and Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1998 through 2000. The position of NSC Senior Director is an operational staff post (as opposed to a primarily analytical or advisory position ). Therefore, the comments below reflect the policy world at a senior executive level in the White House. Although my government responsibilities encompassed policy toward northeast, east, and southeast Asia, my own academic background has focused primarily on China, as will most of the examples in this essay. What Can Scholarship Contribute to the Policy World? The government and the academic communities have very different strengths that they bring to bear in understanding China. The government possesses ongoing access to information on concrete developments that academics cannot hope to match. This access particularly concerns information that is current and specific. A portion of this information, not surprisingly, is in the military arena, but much also concerns actions and individuals who are engaged in economic, domestic political, and foreign affairs. What policymakers are in need of is assistance in refining this flood of information into a form that is useful in informing policy needs. Here is where scholars can make a substantial contribution. Rich understanding of context • Scholars have the time, skill, and incentives to develop a far richer understanding of context. For example, the  By contrast, intelligence analysts must studiously avoid trying to influence policymakers’ decisions. While these analysts have built up a deep understanding of various situations, their task is to provide the necessary information that will enable policymakers to reach conclusions independently . When I once offered to be interviewed by an intelligence analyst who was working on a net assessment, for example, the analyst explained to me in no uncertain terms that my very first access to this assessment process would actually only be when I received a briefing on the final results—an explanation that conformed to the essential distinction between the intelligence and policy worlds. Kenneth Lieberthal is Professor of Political Science, William Davidson Professor of Business Administration at the Ross School of Business, Distinguished Fellow and Director for China at the William Davidson Institute, and Research Associate of the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of Michigan. He served as Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Senior Director for Asia on the National Security Council from August 1998 to October 2000. His government responsibilities encompassed U.S. policy toward all issues involving northeast, east, and southeast Asia. He can be reached at . bridging the gap • roundtable [  ] asia policy academic arena has devoted far more attention than government analysts to a systematic study of how the Chinese political system itself operates: its structure, policymaking process, bureaucratic matrix dilemmas, operating principles, annual rhythms and rituals, document and other communications systems, purposes and roles of various types of meetings and institutions, and ways of thinking about itself. This type of knowledge concerning the Chinese system has at various times played an important role in understanding the real significance (or lack thereof) of specific information that comes in. An example from 2001 illustrates this point. Secretary Powell thought that he had established a good relationship with Qian Qichen when Qian visited Washington, D.C. in March 2001. When the EP-3 incident occurred in April, Secretary Powell quickly placed a phone call to Qian in an early effort to gain control over this serious crisis. When Qian refused the call, however, Powell was miffed and reportedly took this refusal as an indication of China’s unwillingness to cooperate. In reality , China’s system is such that there is no way Qian could have accepted the call before the Politburo Standing Committee had reached consensus on how to respond to the crisis. The U.S. system easily tolerates individual initiative to get out ahead of an issue and potentially defuse a crisis. The new administration did not understand that the Chinese system will not permit this type of approach. Without such knowledge of the inner workings of the...