Moral Ambiguity, "Yes," Moral Confusion, "No"

Jason Scott Robert and Françoise Baylis (2003) focus on the moral issues raised by the contemporary research, both active and proposed, in which "novel interspecies beings" are created from both human and nonhuman cells. They posit that a prevalent view in our society is that "all human beings have an inviolable moral right to life" because they, unlike other life forms, have "full moral rights." Furthermore, their assumption is that "inexorable moral confusion" will likely result when human and nonhuman cells are merged to create novel interspecies beings. I contend that while there might be good reasons to curtail research on interspecies beings with human cells, the fear of inexorable moral confusion is not a good reason. I contend from a Christian theological perspective that, while we should have profound respect for human life, we should not view it as having inviolable rights. Therefore, creating an interspecies being with human and nonhuman cells does not violate any inviolable rights of humanity.

Within the Judeo-Christian tradition there is a clear voice calling for a profound respect for human life but not a granting of absolute value or sacred status. Approximately two decades ago a commentary in JAMA entitled "Death Is Not the Enemy" began: "Karl Barth, a 20th-century Protestant theologian, wrote, 'Life is no second God, and therefore the respect due it cannot rival the reverence owed to God'" (Landau and Gustafson 1984, 2458). This "theocentric view" that all of temporal or historical reality is ontologically conditional and relative in value is rooted deep within the Judeo-Christian tradition. The biblical creation stories in Genesis 1 and 2 present this view clearly. All of the created order came into existence at God's initiative and pleasure, and, while all of it was good, no part of it had absolute value. This understanding has come into clear focus among contemporary theologians. Catholic theologian R. McCormick, S.J. (1985) asserts "Impurity of heart or idolatry is elevating a fragment of the world into the position of God" (106). Protestant W. F. May (1967) points in the same direction: "Men deny God by turning away from him toward some creaturely power, whether it is the glitter of gold, the fertility of the soil, the excitement of a career, the fascination of a woman or the claim of a great public cause" (28). Gustafson (1981) concludes "human life is part of and depends upon realities grander, more majestic, more awesome than humanity itself" (108). The point for us in this discussion is that nothing temporal, not even human life, should be understood as having full or inviolable moral rights to life.

This view of the relative value of human life has become well-established within Western culture. It is not uncommon even for those who promote a "pro-life" or "sanctity of life" agenda to qualify that agenda significantly when they find moral justification for capital punishment and war. Today there is widespread, though not unanimous, agreement that when considering euthanasia there are circumstances in which preservation of life is trumped by the values of reduction of suffering or preservation of human dignity. This debate about euthanasia has been marked by disagreement, complexity, paradox, and ambiguity, but not by an inexorable confusion.

It is my claim that when we are freed to compare and evaluate all the expressions of reality that impinge upon us, we can avoid the fear of an inexorable moral confusion when considering the modification of life forms. We can consider self-manipulation in ways that protect and enhance human life while also respecting other life forms. In this process we will wrestle with complexity, ambiguity, and paradox (Gustafson 1981; McCormick 1973). That is the nature of serious and honest moral deliberation. Responsible moral struggle does not lapse into confusion caused by the assumed presence of an ultimate and complete moral value that cannot be challenged. Rather it acknowledges that perfect understanding is never possible but that...