This website uses cookies to ensure you get the best experience on our website. Without cookies your experience may not be seamless.

Hume Studies

In this Issue

View Formatted Version

Impressions, Ideas, and Ontological Type
Peter Loptson
pp. 123-157
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/hms.2018.0007

"Distinction of Reason" is an Incomplete Symbol
James Van Cleve
pp. 159-166
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/hms.2018.0008

Hume's Pivotal Argument, and His Supposed Obligation of Reason
Peter Millican
pp. 167-208
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/hms.2018.0009

Hume's Use of "Moral Distinctions" in Treatise 3.1.1
Dejan Šimković
pp. 209-247
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/hms.2018.0010

Naturalness and Artificiality in Humean Virtue Theory
Emily Kelahan
pp. 249-276
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/hms.2018.0011

Kant, Hume, and the Interruption of Dogmatic Slumber by Abraham Anderson (review)
Robert Gressis
pp. 275-277
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/hms.2018.0012

Reading Hume on the Principles of Morals ed. by Taylor Jacqueline (review)
Philip A. Reed
pp. 278-280
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/hms.2018.0013

Previous Issue

Volume 44, Number 1, April 2018

Next Issue

Volume 45, Number 1-2, November 2019

Project MUSE Mission

Project MUSE promotes the creation and dissemination of essential humanities and social science resources through collaboration with libraries, publishers, and scholars worldwide. Forged from a partnership between a university press and a library, Project MUSE is a trusted part of the academic and scholarly community it serves.