Precisely because he shared the same premise—namely, that an abyss separates the Marx of the Manuscripts from the so-called mature Marx—Senghor was totally opposed to the thesis that the latter is the true Marx who expressed the truth of socialism. On the contrary, for the Senegalese thinker, the real Marx was the philosopher of 1844 who then somehow betrayed himself through the scientific and positivist language then in the air. The Marx that Senghor adopted, and to whom his spiritualist socialism would always make reference, is precisely the thinker of alienation, not the economist of surplus value. And when Senghor thought of “alienation,” he had in mind the alienation of the human in general and of the colonized humanity in particular. In 1947, in “Marxism and Humanism,” an essay he wrote a few months after the publication in France of the Manuscripts, he declared,

For us, men of 1947, men of the postwar period, who have just escaped the bloody contempt of dictators and who are threatened by other dictators, what a profit to be made from these works of youth! They contain the principles of Marx’s ethics, which propose to us, as the object of our practical activity, the total liberation of man (Senghor 1971: 31).

How did Senghor, a committed Bergsonian and Teilhardian, read what Marx says about alienation? Senghor often quoted or alluded to the following definition in the “alienated labor” chapter of the Manuscripts:

the worker is related to the product of labor as to an alien object. For on this premise it is clear that the more the worker spends himself, the more powerful becomes the alien world of objects which he creates over and against himself, the poorer he himself—his inner world—becomes, the less belongs to him as his own. It is the same in religion. The more man puts into God, the less he retains in himself. The worker puts his life into the object; but now his life no longer belongs to him but to the object. Hence, the greater this activity, the more the worker lacks objects. Whatever the product of his labor is, he is not. Therefore, the greater this product, the less is he himself. The alienation of the worker in his product means not only that his labor becomes an object, an external existence, but that it exists outside him, independently, as something alien to him, and that it becomes a power on its own confronting him. It means that the life which he has conferred on the object confronts him as something hostile and alien (Marx 1932; emphasis in original).

To define alienation, as Marx did, as vapidization, as the loss of vital substance in favor of an external, foreign object that becomes “hostile,” translated perfectly to Senghor’s vitalist philosophy of socialism, founded upon a cosmology of forces that is at the core of the religions of various African homelands, constituting, so to speak, their common denominator.

Alienation is deforcing. The language is metaphysical and ethical at once: the struggle for socialism is the struggle for the reinforcement of élan vital. For Senghor as for Teilhard de Chardin, socialism was in the cosmogonic order of things. Therefore, because the course of things cannot be left without orientation, solely to the free play of market forces, it is an ethical choice to go in the direction of the push of life; that is, toward ever more life and ever more humanism.

In response to what Marx says about God and religion, Senghor cites the Catholic socialist priest Teilhard de Chardin to affirm with him that socialism corresponds to the ethical demand to reach the highest intensities of the force of life. So, after “instinctive life” followed by “reflective life” comes the stage of “co-reflective life” that “multiplies human relations by co-reflection and accelerates the process of socialization, leading individuals and groups toward ‘pan-human convergence.’” And after that stage progress can still be made “toward the ultra-reflective, toward the maximum-being” (Senghor 1946b: 140–41; emphasis in original).