1. Can Beliefs Wrong?
  2. Rima Basu
  3. pp. 1-17
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  1. Belief for Someone Else’s Sake
  2. Simon Keller
  3. pp. 19-35
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  1. Why Epistemic Partiality Is Overrated
  2. Nomy Arpaly, Anna Brinkerhoff
  3. pp. 37-51
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  1. Moral Agency in Believing
  2. Kate Nolfi
  3. pp. 53-74
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  1. Believing in Others
  2. Sarah K. Paul, Jennifer M. Morton
  3. pp. 75-95
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  1. How Can Beliefs Wrong? —A Strawsonian Epistemology
  2. Berislav Marušić, Stephen White
  3. pp. 97-114
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  1. When Beliefs Wrong
  2. Mark Schroeder
  3. pp. 115-127
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  1. Accumulating Epistemic Power: A Problem with Epistemology
  2. Kristie Dotson
  3. pp. 129-154
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  1. Doxastic Morality: A Moderately Skeptical Perspective
  2. Endre Begby
  3. pp. 155-172
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  1. Three Varieties of Faith
  2. Ryan Preston-Roedder
  3. pp. 173-199
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