https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/83 Project MUSE®: Latest articles in International Organization. daily 1 2026-05-13T00:00:00-05:00 text/html en-US Vol. 56 (2002) Latest Articles: International Organization TWO Project MUSE® International Organization 1531-5088 0020-8183 Latest articles in International Organization. Feed provided by Project MUSE® https://muse.jhu.edu/article/14329 <p></p> According to the time-inconsistency literature in monetary economics, even a benevolent social planner has an incentive to announce, and then renege on, a commitment to a low-inflation policy, because an inflationary surprise can result in an increase in national income. Market actors, however, should see through this plan and form inflationary expectations that will make surprise unlikely. As a result, inflation, but not income, should be higher under a discretionary regime than under a regime where credible commitments are possible.1 As the editors of this volume point out, central bank independence and fixed exchange rates have both been put forward as solutions to the benevolent social planner&#39;s problem.2 If ... <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/14337">Read More</a> Project MUSE® https://muse.jhu.edu/ 2026-05-13T00:00:00-05:00 https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/83/image/coversmall Partisan and Electoral Motivations and the Choice of Monetary Institutions Under Fully Mobile Capital 2002-10-01 text/html en-US Partisan and Electoral Motivations and the Choice of Monetary Institutions Under Fully Mobile Capital 2002-10-01 2002 TWO Project MUSE® 117051 2026-05-13T00:00:00-05:00 2002-10-01 https://muse.jhu.edu/article/14330 <p></p> Broz and Frieden 2001.See Alesina 1988; Alesina and Summers 1993; Burdekin and Willett 1991; Cukierman 1992; Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti 1992; Eijffinger and de Haan 1996; and Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini 1991.Eijffinger and de Haan 1996.Cukierman 1992.Calvo and Reinhart 2001.Obstfeld and Rogoff 1995.Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti 1992. See the discussion of this and other scales in Eijffinger and de Haan 1996.Cukierman, Miller, and Neyapti 2001.Cukierman, Miller, and Neyapti 2001, 4.Maxfield 1997, 51.Boylan 1998.It is likely that the continued propensity to peg the exchange rate in these regions is due to Optimal Currency Area (OCA) considerations. For more on the OCA framework, see the following ... <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/14337">Read More</a> Project MUSE® https://muse.jhu.edu/ 2026-05-13T00:00:00-05:00 https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/83/image/coversmall The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions 2002-10-01 text/html en-US The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions 2002-10-01 2002 TWO Project MUSE® 85978 2026-05-13T00:00:00-05:00 2002-10-01 https://muse.jhu.edu/article/14331 <p></p> See Milner and Keohane 1996; Quinn and Inclan 1997; Goodman and Pauly 1993; and Simmons 1999.See Franzese 2002; Frieden 1991; Frieden and Rogowski 1996; Iversen 1999; Keohane and Milner 1996; and Rogowski 1989.See Frieden 1991; Maxfield 1997; and Keohane and Milner 1996.For example, Pempel 1998.For example, Inglehart 1997.See Iversen 1996; Rosenbluth 1996; Franzese 2002; Iversen 1999; and Iversen and Cusak 2000.See Franzese 2002; Roubini and Sachs 1989a and 1989b; and Hallerberg and von Hagen 1999.See Friedman 1968; and Lucas 1972.See Clarida, Gal&#xED;, and Gertler 1999; and Sargent 1999.See Clark forthcoming; Oatley 1999; Clark and Hallerberg 2000; and Simmons 1994.See Frieden 1991; and Franzese 2002.Kitschelt 1994 ... <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/14337">Read More</a> Project MUSE® https://muse.jhu.edu/ 2026-05-13T00:00:00-05:00 https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/83/image/coversmall Political Parties and Monetary Commitments 2002-10-01 text/html en-US Political Parties and Monetary Commitments 2002-10-01 2002 TWO Project MUSE® 83066 2026-05-13T00:00:00-05:00 2002-10-01 https://muse.jhu.edu/article/14332 <p></p> See Blackburn and Christensen 1989; and Fischer 1990.Bernhard, Broz, and Clark 2002.See Clark 2002; Franzese 1999; and Bernhard and Leblang 2002.Keefer and Stasavage 2002.Frieden 2002.Mishkin 1999.Decentralized enforcement via reputation is theoretically possible but rare in practice, perhaps due to the costliness of the long transition during which a reputation for low inflation is established.See Bernhard, Broz, and Clark 2002.Fischer 1990.See Debelle and Fischer 1994; and Alesina and Summers 1993. For surveys, see Eijffinger and de Haan 1996; and de Haan and Kooi 2000. For theoretical treatments addressing this paradox, see Lohmann 1992; and Walsh 1995.Ghosh, Gulde, Ostry, and Wolf 1997.Obstfeld and Rogoff 1995 ... <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/14337">Read More</a> Project MUSE® https://muse.jhu.edu/ 2026-05-13T00:00:00-05:00 https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/83/image/coversmall Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes 2002-10-01 text/html en-US Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes 2002-10-01 2002 TWO Project MUSE® 72474 2026-05-13T00:00:00-05:00 2002-10-01 https://muse.jhu.edu/article/14334 <p></p> Tinbergen 1959, 1963, and 1972.For a presentation and critique of ideas of convergence in institutional choice, see such works as Ellman 1980.See Bernhard and Leblang 2002b; Clark 2002; and Hallerberg 2002.See Broz 2002; Frieden 2002; and Keefer and Stasavage 2002.For example, see Garrett 1998; and Rodrik 1997 and 2000.For a definition of technocracy as a distinct subgroup of bureaucracy that enjoys autonomy and operates with a policy paradigm based on instrumental rationality, see Centeno 1993. While the contributors to this special issue do not advocate a single, optimum regime, most are supportive of democratically supervised, &#x22;independent&#x22; central banks.One explanation for the absence of reversals in central ... <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/14337">Read More</a> Project MUSE® https://muse.jhu.edu/ 2026-05-13T00:00:00-05:00 https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/83/image/coversmall Competing Commitments: Technocracy and Democracy in the Design of Monetary Institutions 2002-10-01 text/html en-US Competing Commitments: Technocracy and Democracy in the Design of Monetary Institutions 2002-10-01 2002 TWO Project MUSE® 94188 2026-05-13T00:00:00-05:00 2002-10-01 https://muse.jhu.edu/article/14335 <p></p> Another broader perspective looks at how EMU was linked to the general drive for European integration. Accurate as this may be&#x2014;for an argument in its favor see Frieden 2001&#x2014;it still relies on implicit assertions about the ultimate costs and benefits of monetary integration. Most such assertions focus, as do the two mentioned here, on the monetary (anti-inflationary) aspects of the process.Such expressions of intent predate the Treaty of Rome, although their relevance was limited before the Bretton Woods system began to collapse. In this article, I call the organization in question the EU, despite its several names in the period under review. For a less telegraphic survey of these developments, see Frieden 1997a. ... <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/14337">Read More</a> Project MUSE® https://muse.jhu.edu/ 2026-05-13T00:00:00-05:00 https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/83/image/coversmall Real Sources of European Currency Policy: Sectoral Interests and European Monetary Integration 2002-10-01 text/html en-US Real Sources of European Currency Policy: Sectoral Interests and European Monetary Integration 2002-10-01 2002 TWO Project MUSE® 65853 2026-05-13T00:00:00-05:00 2002-10-01 https://muse.jhu.edu/article/14336 <p></p> See Bernhard and Leblang 2002; Broz 2002; and Clark 2002.See Clark forthcoming 2003; and Clark and Hallerberg 2000.Keefer and Stasavage 2002.Bernhard, Broz, and Clark 2002.Tsebelis 1995, 1999, and 2001.This definition is broadly consistent with two uses of veto players in the literature&#x2014;Tsebelis 1999 and 2001, which Clark 2002 uses, and Birchfield and Crepaz 1998 and Crepaz 2002. Here I dichotomize the number of party players, which would correspond to the cases for Tsebelis where the ideological distance is zero and greater than zero. The paper&#39; s dichotomy of unitary and fiscal systems also is consistent with the Tsebelis 2001, chap. 6. With regard to Birchfield and Crepaz 1998 and Crepaz 2002, the discussion of ... <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/14337">Read More</a> Project MUSE® https://muse.jhu.edu/ 2026-05-13T00:00:00-05:00 https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/83/image/coversmall Veto Players and the Choice of Monetary Institutions 2002-10-01 text/html en-US Veto Players and the Choice of Monetary Institutions 2002-10-01 2002 TWO Project MUSE® 63583 2026-05-13T00:00:00-05:00 2002-10-01 https://muse.jhu.edu/article/14337 <p></p> See Lohmann 1998; Moser 1999; and Keefer and Stasavage 2000.See Canavan and Tommasi 1997; and Herrendorf 1999.On the idea that exchange rate pegs provide a more transparent form of commitment, see also Broz 2002.Bernhard, Broz, and Clark 2002. See also Bernhard 1998; Maxfield 1997; Broz 2002; Clark and Maxfield 1997; and Bernhard and Leblang 1999.Rogoff 1985.Lohmann 1998. More generally, comparative research on political institutions and policymaking has demonstrated that it is more difficult to pass laws in countries where decision making is divided among multiple veto players, whether a separate executive and legislature in the case of presidential systems or multiple parties within a coalition government within ... <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/14337">Read More</a> Project MUSE® https://muse.jhu.edu/ 2026-05-13T00:00:00-05:00 https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/83/image/coversmall Checks and Balances, Private Information, and the Credibility of Monetary Commitments 2002-10-01 text/html en-US Checks and Balances, Private Information, and the Credibility of Monetary Commitments 2002-10-01 2002 TWO Project MUSE® 41831 2026-05-13T00:00:00-05:00 2002-10-01